Joanne L. Stone v. Todd L. Stone : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Joanne L. Stone v. Todd L. Stone : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent R. Chipman; Fabian & Clendenin, P.C.; attorneys for appellee.
Todd Stone, pro se; appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Joanne L. Stone v. Todd L. Stone, No. 20060353 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6442
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOANNE L. STONE 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
v. 
TODD L. STONE 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060353-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Final Orders Entered in the Third Judicial District Court 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley Presiding 
BRENT R. CHIPMAN (0626) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South state Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Todd Stone, pro se 
31 Al Hillside Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: (801) 277-9955 
Facsimile: (801) 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee Respondent/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Preface Introduction 
This Appeal tries to clarify if the trial court fails to process, or forward to the Court of Appeals, or even 
respond to, or consider the Appellant's timely filed Appeal and objection of March 4, 2005, for over a 
year period of time, and refused to consider such in issuing the Court's Final Order of January 9, 2006 
prejudiced the Appellant when the Trial Court finally responded to such appeal and objection on March 
10, 2006. One of the many issues the Appellant was objecting to was the one sided interview by the 
Custody Evaluator allowing the Appellee and children a second interview with the Custody Evaluator but 
not interviewing the Appellant when the court ordered re-interviews by the custody Evaluator, as well as 
Commissioner's action or ruling that a 13 year old child of the parties could sue her Father in this divorce 
action. Some of the other issues objected to was the Commissioner's failure to record a hearing such that 
the Appellant was denied proper evidence to be used later to defend his position to the higher court and 
needed to obtain an actual complete record of the proceedings for his defense, as well as other 
questionable actions allowed by the Commissioner that transpired before the case advances to trial. 
Another important aspect of this Appeal is basically about what date does a Divorce decree become 
effective and binding upon the court or parties, and when does a Order be considered by the court or 
becomes a Final Order, (either September 11, 2003, August 3, 2005 or January 9, 2006, or March 10, 
2006, or May 15, 2006), and if a non-party can be bound by that Final Order. Furthermore, this appeal 
questions at what date or how or when can any stipulation be withdrawn, or modified, along with 
questioning what persons are parties to a divorce action and what are each of those parties rights, and 
interests, and what is considered defective notice, as well as what must be complied with for a party to 
receive the benefit or relief offered by a statute they seek to use to take away the rights of another party 
by the relief they seek of that statute that requires specific mandatory action for strict compliance with 
that statute. 
This Appeal further seeks to clarify if the parties fail to agree to a stipulation, can the court force it upon 
them without a hearing to determine otherwise, and furthermore, if the parties agree the stipulation is "all 
or nothing and not separable", can the court force the parties to endure binding them to one part and not 
to the other part of the stipulation if one part is invalid since the parties stipulated it was "an all or 
nothing stipulation", and did not agree to separating the issues into two separate agreements. This 
Appeal also seeks to clarify what parties to a divorce action are allowed to have what type of counsel 
representation in order for the ruling to be binding, and if conflicting parties are required to have the same 
counsel represent them if they do not want such counsel and does such afford Due Process for the parties 
interests. 
This appeal also seeks to clarify if the valid and standing orders of the court based on the prior findings of 
fact, and testimony of experts, and if what the court ruled was in the best interests of the children, and 
based on presented evidence, Custody evaluator's findings before the re-interviews, and are to be 
considered binding and effective in the absence of the court later changing such ruling all the while failing 
to hold proper hearing on the best interests of the children and denied due process to presentation of 
evidence and if defective notice was provided, and a valid and binding order does not exist that would 
change the standing order of the court. Are the prior valid and binding standing orders of the court still 
to be upheld and complied with. 
This Appeal also seeks to clarify if Judge Medley has jurisdiction over the Parent Time Mediation office 
and what papers that office can or cannot accept in order for the parties to have timely effective 
mediation, or if counsel acted unethically to mislead and inappropriately influence the parent time 
mediation office trying to represent what a judge would rule, just to gain a personal advantage in the 
case, and thus deny the Appellant of timely mediation and due process, or did Judge Medley's order deny 
effective mediation. 
Additionally, this appeal attempts to seek clarification of a parties rights when applicable statutes change 
during the course of the divorce proceedings, as well as if a criminal case as affected by a ruling in a 
related civil case or if a Commissioner is bound to honor the findings of a Criminal Court, and visa versa, 
or if court's orders or statutes are in conflict; what order or statute is a party to abide by. Additionally, if 
two parties engage in and commit the identically same act because of and based on the rulings of the Civil 
court, why is the man prosecuted for it being a crime and the woman's action is not considered a criminal 
offense. Additionally if preprinted forms used in the court order conflict with state statute, what is a 
party supposed to comply with. 
This appeal appeals the assessment of attorney fees against the Appellant for trying to correct the 
deficiencies of the court's order or forms, so that the final order may comply with statutory requirements 
and a valid, binding Final Order may be achieved. 
This Appeal if filed in conjunction with the Appellant's previously filed Motions seeking certification of 
Constitutionality that were reported would be considered and responded to with this Appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002 as amended) of a final order entered January 9, 
2006 entitled Supplemental Judgment and Decree of divorce and subsequent orders 
regarding modifications and attorneys fees [Attached as Addendum "1".] 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) provides in a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter 
of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. "If an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal." Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,^ f 7, 13 P.3d 616. When a 
notice of appeal is not filed within the thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment, 
"this court may entertain [the] appeal only if the time for appeal was appropriately 
extended." Id. A judgment is entered when it is signed by the trial judge 
and filed with the clerk. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A (b)-(c). The time for appeal is extended 
by certain motions, Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1) provides if a party timely files in the trial 
court any of the following motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the judgment 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion: 
(A) A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(B) A motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
l 
(C) A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; 
(D) A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Utah R. App. P. 4(c) provides that a notice of appeal filed after announcement or 
entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 
4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof 
In this case Mr. Stone extended the time for filing the notice of appeal by filing at 
least three motions listed under Rule 4(b) and in an abundance of caution he also filed 
two motions for an extension of time but when the orders on extensions were filed they 
were moot because the appeal had been timely filed. 
The Supplemental Judgment and Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law was filed, signed and entered on January 9, 2006. Mr. Stone 
filed a "Motion for Mis-Trial" on January 9, 2006 this motion should be treated as a 
motion for a new trial under Rule 4(b) ID. Mr. Stone also filed "Respondent's motion for 
Sanctions of Counsel and Petitioner" on January 9, 2006 which should be treated as a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 4(b) ID as it was filed concurrently 
with the motion for new trial. On January 19, 2006 Mr. Stone filed a "Motion to Accept 
Prior filings" which should be treated as a motion to amend or make additional findings 
of fact pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Mr. Stone 
clearly filed at least three motions after the entry of the order that would extend the time 
for filing the notice of appeal. 
2 
On February 8, 2006 the commissioner held a hearing on the motions filed by Mr. 
Stone from December 2005 and up until January 9, 2006. During this hearing the 
commissioner addressed issues concerning property, the children, and the court reserved 
the right to send out a minute entry if a motion filed is not properly before the 
commissioner. The remaining motions were taken under advisement, it should be noted 
that the motion for Mis-Trial was not addressed. 
On February 8, 2006 Mr. Stone, to insure he did not give up his right to appeal, 
and out of an abundance of caution to insure filed his first Petition for Extension of Time 
to file appeal. The Commissioner on February 24, 2006 granted an extension to March 
10, 2006. Again on March 10, 2006 out of an abundance of caution and even though he 
had filed motions under Rule 4(b)(1) Mr. Stone filed a second motion for extension of 
time. On April 3, 2006 the Commissioner ruled on the issues he had taken under 
advisement from the February 8, 2006 hearing and denied the second petition for 
extension of time. It should be again be noted that the "Motion for Mis-Trial" was not 
addressed. 
On April 14, 2006 Mr. Stone timely filed his Notice of Appeal and case No. 
20060353-CA was assigned. 
On April 20, 2006, six days after the Notice of appeal was filed, Judge Medley 
signed, the order on Mr. Stone's motions that were taken under advisement on February 
8, 200. The Order was signed on April 20, 2006 and pursuant to Rule 4(b), this Appeal 
shall be treated as filed after entry of the order on April 20, 2006 and on the day thereof. 
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Alternatively, it should be noted that from the record it appears the motion for a 
Mis-Trial (which in actuality is a motion for a new trial) was never heard. Therefore the 
time to file the Notice of Appeal would still be open if the other motions filed pursuant to 
the rule did not extend the time to file. In that case, should the Court of Appeals 
determine it does not have jurisdiction because the motion for a new trial was never 
heard, the case should be remanded back to the trial judge for a hearing on the Motion for 
Mis-Trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that 23 days notice of 
the Appelee's move to California complied with the 60 day notice provision of the 
relocation statute U.C.A.§30-3-37. The trial court also erred by failing to make 
appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation as 
required by the Statute. 
Standard of Review: 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, P17, 977 P.2d 1201. 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Motion to Dismiss, Set Aside 
Hearing, Report, Judgment, Etc. & Affidavit. [Addendum 2] 
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2. Alternatively, if the relocation statute was complied with, then the trial 
court failed to properly apply the best interest analysis according to U.C.A. §§ 3-30-10 
and 3-30-10.2 prior to allowing the relocation of children at the October 5, 2005 
hearing... 
Standard of Review 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, P17, 977 P.2d 1201. "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in 
divorce matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Trial courts have 
broad discretion in making custody determinations, Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); awarding alimony, Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); and in awarding attorney fees, see Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 
73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). While the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we 
presume the correctness of the court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of. . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987). 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Motions for Separate Counsel, 
for Child Welfare and for Preservation of the Minor's Right to Proper Representation 
[Addendum 2] 
3. The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to insure a parenting plan 
was incorporated in the divorce decree as required by U.C.A.§30-10.8 and 10.9. 
5 
Standard of Review: 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, P17, 977 P.2d 1201. 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Motion to Dismiss, Set Aside 
Hearing, Report, Judgment, Etc. & Affidavit. [Addendum 2] 
4. The district court failed to address the disputed issues that existed since 
time of filing the divorce action and were not resolved in the final order denying the 
Appellant due process by failing to comply with U. C. A. §30-3-5(l)a-d. 
Standard of Review: 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, P17, 977 P.2d 1201. Whether a party has been afforded adequate 
due process is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. In re J.B., 2002 UT App 268, 
P7, 53 P.3d 968. 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Motions to for Separate 
Counsel, for Child Welfare and for Preservation of the Minor's Right to Proper 
Representation and in petitioners Motion #1 for Finding Petitioner in Contempt. 
[Addendum 3 and 4] 
5. The District Court failed to timely address the Appellant's March 4, 2005 
objections to Commissioner Casey's recommendations and therefore denied him due 
process under the United States and Utah Constitutions 
Standard of Review: 
Whether a parent has been afforded adequate due process is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. In re J.B., 2002 UT App 268, P7, 53 P.3d 968. 
The issue was preserved for review in Respondent's Appeal and Objections to 
Prior Court Actions and Contempt, Todd Stone, pro se Respondent [Addendum 5] 
6. The January 9, 2006 Order is not a valid Final Order because the parties did 
not agree to it. 
Standard of Review 
Although appeals courts generally review the determinations is a divorce decree 
for an abuse of discretion, "[i]nsofar as that determination is based on a conclusion of 
law, it is reviewed for correctness." Krambule v. Krambule, 1999 UT App 357,P10, 994 
P.2d 210, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stones Motion to Assign Marital Debt 
and Notice of Lack of Jurisdiction. [Addendum 6] 
7. The trial court erred by failing to allow the two youngest children to hire 
and be represented by an attorney of their choice denying them due process and equal 
application of the law and allowing one of the children to sue her father denied him due 
process of law.. 
Standard of Review: 
7 
Whether a party has been afforded adequate due process is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. In re J.B., 2002 UT App 268, P7, 53 P.3d 968. 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Motion to Allow Minor 
Children Proper Representation and Notice of Appearance of Counsel filed August 2004. 
[Addendum 7 and 8] 
8. The award of Attorney fees on April 25, 2006 is not supported by the 
evidence and the court erred in accepting a fee Affidavit filed under an incorrect case 
number. 
Standard of Review: 
An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Wells v. Wells, 
871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The decision to award attorney fees and the 
amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court." Kellev v. Kelley, 
2000 UT App 236, P30, 9 P.3d 171 
The issue was preserved for review in Mr. Stone's Objections No. 3 to Aug 3, 
2005. [Addendum at 9] 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U C. A. §30-3-5(l)a-d. Attached as Addendum 10. 
U. C. A. §§ 3-30-10 Attached as Addendum 11. 
U. C. A. 3-30-10.2 Attached as Addendum 12. 
U. C. A. 3-30-10.8 Attached as Addendum 13. 
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U. C. A. 3-30-10.9 Attached as Addendum 14. 
U. C. A. §30-3-37. Attached as Addendum 15. 
U. C. A. Sections 30-3-34 & 35 Attached as Addendum 16. 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Attached as Addendum 17. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution Attached as Addendum 18. 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution Attached as Addendum 19. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution Attached as Addendum 20. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case that has spun wildly out of control, with the unfortunate 
result being that Mr. Stone and his children have been irreparably harmed. This matter 
has seen two parties who, as Appellee's counsel correctly noted are unable to agree on 
the day of the week, engaged in seemingly endless litigation with no end in sight. The 
trial Judge and the Commissioner have thrown up their hands in frustration with the 
intransience of the parties and has improperly sought to impose a resolution of the matter 
by imposing a final order on the parties that is unworkable, incomplete invalid and was 
not agreed to by the parties. The trial court has ignored the fact that the order fails 
incorporate the requirements of statute, the trial court has denied Mr. Stone due process 
and a meaningful right to be heard on the issue of the best interests of his children 
As noted by the commissioner, throughout this proceeding Mrs. Stone has 
engaged in effective trench warfare for personal advantage and not for the proper 
application of the judicial system. The marital estate was relatively modest, yet her 
counsel has billed her more than $97,000.00 for services rendered in the six plus years 
this matter has been pending. But because of the close personal relationship with her 
counsel Mrs. Stone has not had to pay the fee billed and thus fails to feel any effect of her 
unwillingness to be reasonable and protect the best interests of the children. She has 
consistently chosen delay over expediency and conflict over resolution in this proceeding 
culminating in the defective notice of her relocation to California with the children. 
It is incomprehensible that in a divorce proceeding that has been as rancorous and 
contentious as this one that Mrs. Stone would choose to give 23 days notice of her 
impending move to California instead of strictly complying with the letter of the 
relocation statute by providing 60 days notice, if possible. Instead of complying strictly 
with the statute, which given the circumstances of this litigation would only be 
reasonable, Mrs. Stone chose instead to ignore the clear language of the statute and 
continue the path of maximum costly litigation that has characterized her conduct 
throughout this proceeding and depriving Mr. Stone of a meaningful right to respond to 
the loss of his children as well as virtually guaranteeing that the matter would be the 
subject of further litigation. 
Ms. Stone did not have a job waiting in California and in fact the move occasioned 
the loss of health insurance for the children, but somehow the trial court was able to 
determine the move, though not complying with the relocation statute, was in the best 
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interests of the children. On three separate occasions the commissioner found in light of 
the conduct of Mrs. Stone and with the input of the custody evaluation that the children 
should remain in Utah with Mr. Stone. 
Mr. Stone has been out gunned in this legal battle. He has not had the resources to 
respond with the legal firepower that $97,000.00 can buy his ex-wife. During the course 
of this proceeding he has lost his job and his health. However, the greatest loss is loss of 
his children due to the trial court's misapplication of the relocation statute. The children 
begged the court to listen to their Plea that they remain with their dad but their pleas went 
unheard and unheeded. 
When the events of this case are viewed from afar it becomes strikingly evident 
that Mr. Stone and his children have suffered irreparable and possibly irreversible harm 
from the inability of the trial court to separate its distain for an admittedly difficult to deal 
with pro se litigant from the trial courts duty to give that father and his children the due 
process to which they are entitled. Where Mrs. Stone has had access to seemingly 
unlimited legal resources Mr. Stone's only viable response has been to file a flurry of 
motions with the hope that at some point during this long and excruciatingly difficult 
process he will have the opportunity to be heard and justice and due process could be 
served 
The separate issues of this appeal are discussed below but the single overriding 
issue of this appeal is the fact that Mr. Stone and his children have been denied basic 
fairness and due process throughout the course of this action. The trial courts decision to 
allow the relocation of the children to California as a result of the fatally flawed 
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relocation hearing has had the most profound impact on Mr. Stone and his children 
however there are a myriad of other issues that have not been properly addressed as well. 
When the District Court failed to act upon or respond to, or consider a filed 
appeal/objection to its rulings for over one year, Mr. Stone and his children are denied 
due process. When the District Court, over the objection of one of the parties to a divorce 
accepts an invalid and non-binding stipulated agreement and changes it into a valid and 
binding order of the court without an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Stone and his children are 
denied due process. On December 12, 2005 less than a month before the January 9, 2006 
hearin^the^riaLODurtallowed-Mr. JStane^s^ounseLto^ithd^ 
at the hearing that her actions prejudiced Mr. Stone and even though Mr. Stone made the 
court was aware of the problem. 
The parties never reached agreement on the stipulation that provided justification 
for the improper relocation of the children to California and formed the basis both for 
final order. Contrary to the representations made at the relocation hearing that the parties 
had entered into a deal and it was negotiated Appellee's counsel stated quite emphatically 
in the August 3, 2005 settlement hearing that "[T]here is no deal if she [Annabelle Stone, 
a nonparty to the divorce proceeding] doesn't sell the property" and "[W]e don't have a 
deal if the properties are not listed and the $ 40,000 is not distributed as agreed upon", 
and "[T]he agreement was premised on the fact that we would have Annabelle Stone 
agree to list the properties; if she doesn't sell the properties, then I do not think we have a 
settlement." 
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A stipulation is a contract and should be analyzed using contract law principles. 
The basic premise of contract to be binding on the parties is for there to be a meeting of 
the minds. The above statements by Mr. Chipman vividly illustrate the fact that there was 
not a meeting of the minds because Annabelle Stone was not a party and could not be 
bound and the trial judge recognized she could be bound stating*he would cross that 
bridge if need be' yet when the need arose the bridge was not crossed. 
The relocation notice was actually a cover letter for Mrs. Stones objections to 
proposed findings of fact and to the supplemental decree illustrating that at the time the 
notice of relocation was filed there was not a meeting of the minds or an agreement 
contrary to the assertions of Mrs. Stone at the relocation hearing. 
This appeal also seeks to require the trial court to comply with the statutory 
mandate of U. C. A. §30-3-5(1) a-d regarding the division of debts, joint obligations and 
insurance. 
This appeal questions the propriety of the trial court allowing the oldest daughter 
to sue her father through the guardian ad litem in the divorce and then refusing the 
request of the two younger children to hire separate counsel. Unquestionably when 
counsel for all the children acts on behalf of one of the children to sue their father an 
instant conflict of interest arises and the trial court yet again denied Mr. Stone and his 
children due process. 
A party to a divorce has a right to expect that all of the issues existing at the time 
of filing divorce action will be resolved in a final order and the trial court will protect the 
Constitutional Rights of the children, their divorcing parents and other affected parties. 
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A party to a divorce has a right to expect the trial court will address the issues raised in 
the case in their proper order, and will afford all parties Due Process in so doing. A party 
to a divorce has a right expect the trial court will require strict compliance with its valid 
orders by both the husband and the wife and will not favor the interest of the party that 
can afford $97,000 in attorney fees over the interests of the one that cannot. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Jurisdiction 
1. Supplemental Judgment and Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was filed signed and entered on January 9, 2006 
[Addendum 1] 
2. Respondent filed motion for Mis-Trial on January 9, 2006. [Addendum 21]. 
3. Respondent's motion for Sanctions of Counsel and Petitioner was filed 
January 9, 2006. [Addendum 22]. 
4. Respondent's motion to Accept Prior filings was filed January 19, 2006. 
[Addendum 23]. 
5. On February 8, 2006 the commissioner held a law and motion hearing. 
Issues concerning property and the children were addressed and the court reserved the 
right to send out a minute entry if a motion filed is not properly before the commissioner. 
The remaining motions were taken under advisement. [Transcript attached as Addendum 
24] 
6. On February 8, 2006 Respondent filed his first Petition for Extension of 
Time to file appeal. [Addendum 25 Docket at Page 54]. 
14 
7. On February 24, 2006 Commissioner's Minute entry Ruling on the 
Respondent's Petition for Extension of Time - Extension Granted to March 10, 2006 
granted. [Addendum 25 Docket at Page 55]. 
8. On March 10, 2006 respondent files a second motion for extension of time. 
[Addendum 25 Docket at Page 56]. 
9. On April 3, 2006 Commissioner's Under Advisement with ruling on 
Respondent's Second Petition for Extension of time - Denied [Addendum 25 Docket at 
Page 56]. 
10. On April 14, 2006 the Notice of Appeal Case No. 20060353-CA filed. 
[Addendum 25 Docket at Page 56]. 
11. On April 20, 2006 the Order on Respondent's Motions was signed by Judge 
Medley. These were the motions taken under advisement on February 8, 2006. 
[Addendum 25 Docket at Page 57]. 
B. Issues Presented 
12. On June 21, 2001 the Appellee Joanne Stone filed a Petition for Divorce 
Case No. 014903655. [Addendum 26] Respondent filed a Counter Petition [Addendum 
27]. 
13. The petition did not contain a parenting plan. 
14. From the beginning the matter has been highly adversarial and 
confrontational with each party filing a host of motions. Mr. Stone has been represented 
by 4 different attorneys of record but has appeared pro se for the majority of the 
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proceedings because of his lack of financial resources and the trial courts failure to 
resolve the pressing financial issues that were before it time and time again.. 
15. On July 25, 2001 the parties appeared before Commissioner Casey on Mrs. 
Stone's motion for order to show cause and temporary orders. The parties entered into a 
stipulation [Addendum at 28], that provided, among other things, that the parties agreed 
to a custody evaluation by Matthew Davis if he was available. [Addendum 28 Transcript 
at page 4, line 20-25; page 5 line 1, pg 34 In 19-25 and page 1-22] 
16. At the hearing held October 8, 2004 the court heard evidence and took 
testimony from the GAL and custody evaluator that it was not in the children's best 
interest to be taken away from Mr. Stone and it was not in their best interest to be placed 
in a new school after the school year had started in June or July, additionally the custody 
evaluator again requested of the court and parties a parenting plan. [Addendum 25 
Docket at Page 32]. 
17. Mrs. Stone refused Mr. Stones request to have the custody evaluator help 
develop a quality, workable fair parenting plan. 
18. The August 3, 2005 settlement hearing before Judge Medley failed to 
resolve all the pending issues that existed between the parties. [Addendum 29]. 
19. At the August 3, 2005 hearing Mr. Stone only agreed to settlement of 
matters pertaining to attorney fees, and daycare expenses paid by the Appellant. At no 
time did he agree that all of the pending issues had been resolved. [Addendum 29 page 3, 
line 23-24] 
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20. At the August 3, 2005 hearing Mrs. Stone agreed to release all of her prior 
claims against the Appellant for Attorney fees, and daycare expenses, because of her 
willful refusal to allow Mr. Stone or his family to tend the parties' children, and because 
Mr. Stone had been unemployed for a great amount of time. [Addendum 29 page 3, line 
15-25] 
21. At the August 3, 2005 hearing Mrs. Stone released her claims for Alimony 
and past child support from the Appellant because he was no longer working at his 
former place of employment, and his wages were significantly lower, in fact she was 
making more than Mr. Stone was at this time. [Addendum 29 page 3, line 13-14] 
22. At the August 3, 2005 hearing Mrs. Stone agreed she would not seek her 
attorneys fees in this matter. [Addendum 29 page 3, line 23-25] 
23. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 13, Linel3], Judge 
Medley sees the "agreement" as not an enforceable Order. 
24. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 13, Line 24], Mr. 
Chipman represents the agreement is contingent upon the parties properties being listed 
for sale by Annabelle Stone, who is not a party to the divorce action and the Guardian ad 
litem agrees to the same stipulation. [Addendum 29 Page 14, Linel4]. 
25. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 19, Line9], Mr. Stone's 
acceptance, modification, or rejection of the stipulations of the "Agreement" was 
inaudible, only a confirmation was made that it was heard not agreed to. 
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26. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 22, Linel5], the 
unrepresented, and uninvolved party Annabelle Stone, fails to agree to the stipulations of 
the "agreement" 
27. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 23, LinelO], and Mr. 
Chipman reiterates that the "agreement" is premised on the fact that Annabelle Stone 
agree to sell the properties. 
28. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 23, Linel5], Mr. 
Chipman further clarifies with "if she (Annabelle Stone) does not sell the properties, then 
I don't think we have a settlement, 
29. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 23, Line 25], Ms. 
Corporon counsel for the Appellant, again clarifies for the court, that "we do not have a 
binding agreement today". 
30 At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 24, Line 3], Mr. 
Chipman states for the court on the record, that we don't have a deal if: "one, the 
properties aren't listed, and two, the $40,000.00 is not divided as agreed upon...that was 
negotiated." 
31. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 24, Line 9-18], Judge 
Medley states that "the agreement is accepted as it had been stipulated in this case, if 
Annabelle Stone agrees to the sale of the properties." 
32. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 24, Line21], Judge 
Medley recognized if the sale of the properties does not go through, there is no deal and 
accepted that "agreement." 
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33. At the August 3, 2005 hearing however, [Addendum 29 Page 25, Line4], 
after some of the parties had agreed to the stipulations, Judge Medley turns the stipulated 
"agreement" completely opposite, and stated, "the whole "agreement" is not set aside if 
the stipulations are not met", yet none of the parties had agreed to that change by Judge 
Medley. 
34. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 24, Lines 9-15], the 
Guardian ad litem attempts to alter and change the "agreement", and only Mr.Chipman 
agrees on Line #17, and again on Line # 25, to those changes presented by the Guardian 
ad litem, NOT the reversing changes made by Judge Medley, Mr. Stone did not agree to 
the changes submitted by the GAL. 
35. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 26, Linel2], Judge 
Medley states on the record, that he can't force a stipulation on the parties. 
36. At the August 3, 2005 hearing [Addendum 29 Page 27, Line7], Judge 
Medley states that he is accepting the "agreement" as stipulated, but fails to clarify what 
specific stipulated Agreement he is accepting, the one all parties agreed to, that being if 
the properties do not sell, that there is no agreement or some other agreement. 
37. At the August 3, 2005 hearing the Judge changed the Stipulation to provide 
that there is an "agreement" even if the properties do not sell, yet custody and properties 
were an all or nothing agreement. [Addendum 29 Page 28, Line 6]. 
38. None of the parties agreed to the modification made by Judge Medley that 
there was an agreement even in the absence of an agreement by Annabelle Stone to sell 
the properties. 
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39. At the August 3, 2005 hearing on [Addendum 29 Page 28, Linell], Judge 
Medley states he would sign the Transcript as the Order, if the parties do not agree to the 
wording of an Order. The act of signing the Transcript would have produced a more 
accurate account of the "agreement" than has been produced by the fabricated and 
adulterated Order prepared by Mr. Chipman. 
40. As part of the stipulated "agreement" of August 3, 2005, any disputed 
issues were authorized to advance to mediation [Addendum 29 Page 2, Line 15], without 
any other court involvement, thus Mr. Stone was not required to have counsel file the 
mediation paperwork with his counsel as Judge Medley later ordered on September 30, 
2005, thereby arbitrarily picking and choosing which parts of the agreement to enforce 
and which parts to ignore denying Mr. Stone Due Process. 
41. Mediation of Parent time was attempted, but Brent Chipman got it canceled 
before it had commenced. Thus, there was no agreement between the Appellee, and the 
Appellant regarding Parent time for the parent time schedule since the Appellee later 
attempted to move. Denial of mediation before the Appellee moved the children away 
prevented Due Process of the Parent Time for the Appellant. Mediation was part of the 
stipulations, thus it must have been allowed to occur prior to having any valid 
"agreement" mediation of the issues is mandatory. 
42. Another stipulation of the "agreement" as found on [Addendum 29 Page 2, 
Line 19-32], was that in the event that the "agreement discussed that day did not work, 
then the court would hold an evidentiary hearing on the facts and information, and on 
Parent Time matters. Thus, the parties stipulated that the court would hold an evidentiary 
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hearing and it has not, thus the "agreement" should have been vacated, rather than 
executed until such time as an Evidentiary hearing of the facts is held, and thus the 
"agreement" was not a valid agreement for the court to base its determination of October 
6, 2005 because an evidentiary hearing was promised to occur, to make the "agreement" 
work, after such time as mediation had been completed mediation was scheduled for 
October 20, 2005. 
43. On September 7, 2005 Joanne's counsel faxed and hand delivered to 
Todd's counsel a letter purporting to give notice of her intent to move to California with 
the children on October 1, 2005. [Addendum 30]. 
44. Because the court refused to consider any of the facts presented to it by Mr. 
Stone and faced with relocation of her grandchildren against their will and for improper 
motive a petition for Grandparent visitation was filed with the court by the children's 
grandmother on September 29, 2005. [Addendum 25 Docket page 47]. 
45. The trial court sue sponte convened a relocation hearing on October 6, 
2005. [Addendum 31 Page 1, Line 24-25]. 
46. The trial judge remarked at the hearing "I think there's a preference that the 
notice be 60 days if possible, and if its going to be shorter than 60 days then if we follow 
the language of the statute it needs to be impossible to give a 60 day notice." [Addendum 
31 Page 3, Line 7-12]. 
47. On January 9, 2006 a hearing for entry of supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law was held before Judge Medley. [Addendum 32] 
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48 Judge Medley admitted that "I can't say to you that I have read every 
motion that has been filed. I at least read their title."[Page 76 In 10-11 Addendum 32] 
49. Judge Medley said "I'm now referencing the document that Mr. Stone paid 
the most attention to at least in his oral presentation, was the document that has a title 
Objections No. 3 to Aug 3, 2005 hearing. I do want to make apparent that the Court only 
considered the first 10 pages of that document because beyond that it extends the 
limitations of Rule 7 and this court clearly did not give permission to Mr. Stone or any 
counsel I think is required by rule, even for objections if you intend them to be longer 
than 10 pages which that objection is, and I want to make it clear the balance of the 
objection is stricken." [Page 100 In 12-24 Addendum 32] 
50. The trial court stated, "Mr. Stone's objections are clearly on the record and 
preserved."[Page 101 In 11-12 Addendum 32] 
51. The trial court refused to address issues of insurance and other matters that 
that Mr. Stone raised stating, "I believe that it may very well be that the motions that 
were filed by Mr. Stone During the month of- maybe the latter part of November and all 
of December and into January may already be set for hearing before the commissioner." 
Recognizing there were many issues unresolved. [Page 102 line 8-2 Addendum 32] 
52. The trial court refused to address issues concerning the children's visitation 
with their father that had been raised December 12, 2005 by the GAL. [Addendum 33] 
53. The hearing Judge Medley referenced on January 9, 2006 was held before 
Commissioner Casey on February 8, 2006. [Addendum 34] 
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54. Commissioner Casey said, "...in reading the Decree, one thing that did 
stand out in this decree is that it doesn't say anything about who's responsible for 
payment of the mortgages or any debts or anything like that". [Addendum 34 Page 133, 
Line 3] 
55. Commissioner Casey said he recognized the fact that the order failed to list 
the facts, but that the order left ambiguity and relies on any party's assumption rather 
than specifics. [Addendum 34 Page 133, Line 15] 
56. The court recognized based on the lack of completeness of the 
Supplemental Decree as being a "Final Order" there were still "sort of an open issue that 
is not addressed in the decree about." (Issues Mr. Stone had motioned for hearing and 
court determination)." [Addendum 34 Page 134, Line 14] 
57. Commissioner Casey said, in direct opposition to what Mr. Brent Chipman 
was stating and arguing the Supplemental Decree provided the court states "that's not 
what the decree says". [Addendum 34 Page 135, Line 14] 
58. This also supports that the property distribution as expressed in the 
Supplemental Decree was problematic at best, with the court noting that the Appellant 
did not have any right in a separate pending litigation proceeding to funds pertinent to 
this litigation proceeding, again, the ambiguity and conflict of court jurisdiction over any 
of the nine (9) different parties involved or affected by the inaccurate, incomplete, 
unenforceable, or void Supplemental Decree of January 9, 2006. 
59. The court says it will rule on this in writing, yet it only issues a minute 
entry rather than an order that poses problems of Judge Medley and others not accepting 
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minute entries rather than orders as they are not final orders. [Addendum 34 Page 136, 
Line 9] 
60. The court still questions the applicability of the Supplemental Decree and 
Mr. Stone's involvement or the legal claim of either Mr. Stone, or his mother, 
[Addendum 34 Page 139, Line 14] where Commissioner Casey and Mr. Chipman 
recognized previously on page 121, Lines #21-25, that his Mother was not a party to the 
case being heard. 
61 The court recognized that based on the fallacies and inadequacies, and error 
or invalidity, or non-compliance with State Statute, of the Supplemental Decree, not 
being a Final Order, that as the court stated "there's still a question as to the proceeds, "as 
to who they belong to "under this decree". [Addendum 34 Page 140, Line 35] 
62. The court further acknowledges the Supplemental Decree is clear about 
things that were not happening with regards to the children. Like a proper parenting plan 
and specific visitation dates. Again, the court in questioning the Decree, and what was to 
be done to conform to the decree, and the children's best interests and their right to be 
with their father. [Addendum 34 Page 147, Line 1-19] 
63 The court recognized there were a "whole bunch of financial things that 
needed to be straightened out," as a result of the deficiencies of the Supplemental Decree. 
[Addendum 34 Page 148, Line 2] 
64. The Appellant was prejudiced and inappropriately denied parent time 
visitation for Christmas 2005. At the December 12, 2005 hearing on Mr. Stone's counsels 
request to withdraw the Guardian stated [Addendum 33 Page 64, Line 6] "It's just going 
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to throw a wrench in the works as to .. .(parent time visitation with the children), .. .but if 
we could just get into place the issues concerning my clients, (the children and their 
visitation/ custody) I can't imagine there are concerns that would not allow her (counsel 
Mary Corporon) to act in her client's interest regarding the time sharing issues" 
65. The court again ignored the parent time issue and the Guardian ad litem on 
and states that nothing that had been filed had addressed the Parent Time schedule. 
[Addendum 33 Page 68, Line 24] 
66. At the July 14, 2003 hearing Item # 2 in the official court docket, records 
that "the parties are mutually restrained from disposing of any marital funds without the 
agreement of the court". [Addendum 25 Page 18] 
67. Mrs. Stone ignored the order restraining her from doing so and withdrew 
almost $4,000.00 of marital funds from the parties' Joint account at America First Credit 
Union. The Appellee used a significant amount of these funds for payment on her 
personal credit card. This is a significant amount since it represents more than 75% of all 
the available funds that were possible to have been drawn out of that account to be shared 
by either party or to be available to Mr. Stone for payments required by the court. 
[Addendum 32 Page 79, Line 12-15] 
68. Mrs. Stone violated the prior order and failed to disclose her withdrawal of 
joint funds to the court or the Appellant at the August 3, 2005 hearing or since. Thus she 
benefited unjustly and prejudiced Mr. Stone by violating the order of the court. Later, Dr. 
Davies who had received a portion of the funds given him by Mrs. Stone returned the 
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funds to Mrs. Stone, because she had terminated his services, before the District Court 
had determined the need of his services and without a parenting plan being in place. 
69. The January 9 2006 Order provides that each party pay their own attorney 
fees. Yet Mr. Stone was unjustly assessed attorney fees in retaliation for his attempt to 
get the many unaddressed issues in the supplemental decree resolved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The relocation statute which is codified as U. C. A. §30-3-37(1) states that "when 
either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more . . . that parent 
shall provide if possible 60 days advance written notice of the intended relocation to the 
other parent. . ." Mrs. Stone delivered her notice to Mr. Stone on September 7, 2005 at 
the end of a letter to Mr. Stones counsel, that was written to address Mrs. Stone's 
objections to the proposed Supplemental findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to 
the proposed Supplemental Decree, she gave him a 23 days notice of her intention to 
move the children to California. She was prevented from giving 60 days notice, if 
possible, because "she is faced with the elimination of all future increases to her income 
unless she obtains a four year degree.... she has therefore determined to move to 
California." 
She did not have a job waiting for her that may have been justification for the 
move, apparently it was not possible to give proper notice because of her desire to look 
for employment in California, and this is not a proper reason under the statute. Because 
she went to California without a job waiting for her the children were without health 
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insurance. The provision for health was vital but ignored by the court as the parties 
children suffer from heart skin and vision problems and now the oldest has been 
diagnosed with ovarian cancer so providing no loss of insurance was a desperate need in 
this situation but a need that went unaddressed. 
Additionally, the children were not going to be starting school in California in 
October 2005 as was represented to the trial court at the relocation hearing. There was a 
minute entry ruling from the October 8, 2004 hearing on Petitioners Motion to Sell the 
Marital Home and Move the Children in which the Commissioner, based upon the 
finding of the custody evaluator and the guardian ad litem, found it was not in the best 
interests of the children to be placed in a new school after it had started in June. Yet in 
the October 6, 2005 the trial court failed to make any findings as to what had changed 
over the course of two years to justify uprooting the children in the middle of the school 
year in Utah for a move to California especially since the California school had already 
been in year long session since June 2005, a fact that Mrs. Stone misrepresented to the 
trial court at the relocation hearing. 
It is simply illogical to read the plain language of the relocation statute to 
contemplate an instance, such as this, where a party cannot comply with the plain 
language of the statute and give 60 days notice because they are not going to get a raise 
so they have decided to relocate hundreds of miles away without a job and without 
medical insurance for three children who desperately need it. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to properly apply U. C. A §30-3-
37(2) which states the court should make appropriate orders regarding the parent-time 
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and costs for parent-time transportation at the relocation hearing. The trial court made &G 
absolutely no orders regarding parent-time and the costs for parent time transportation 
even though the three children were immediately moved to California and the costs of 
visitation were substantial. As a result of the move Mr. Stone has been unable to see the 
children since October 2005 because even though she now claims the January 9, 2006 
supplemental decree is binding on the parties Mrs. Stone finds it more convenient to 
ignore the order and allow her attorney to pad his exorbitant fees at the expense of Mr. 
Stone and his children. 
In exercising its discretion in child custody matters the trial court should be guided 
at all times by the best interests of the child. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). However, conducting a best interest analysis does not supplant the 
requirement that the relocation statute be complied with. It is assumed that legislature is 
keenly aware of mandate it has given the Courts of this state to act in the best interests of 
the child in custody matters and requiring compliance with the statute is in harmony with 
the best interests of the child. In other words if the statute is not complied with it is not in 
the best interest of the children to allow the move. 
Even assuming the relocation statute complied with a traditional best interest 
analysis, such an analysis is not sufficient to address the unique conditions of an 
interstate move and the traditional best interest analysis should be refined for cases of the 
interstate relocation of the children. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that a 
traditional best interest analysis may not be sufficient when one parent seeks the move a 
couple's children hundreds of miles away. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refined the 
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traditional best interest analysis in relocation cases in Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 
(Pa. Super. 1990). The Gruber court held that in assessing the custodial parent's request to 
move, the trial judge should consider: 
1) the potential advantages of the proposed move and the likelihood that it would 
substantially improve the quality of life for the custodial parent and the children, 
including any non-economic factors that might contribute to happiness and well-being; 
2) the integrity of the motives of both parents, the one seeking to move and the 
one opposing the move; and 
3) the availability of realistic, substitute visitation arrangements to foster the 
ongoing relationship between the children and the non-custodial parent, with the caveat 
that the existing pattern of visitation need not be reproduced as each case will require a 
balancing of all interests. 
A similar refined best interest analysis should be adopted in Utah or alternatively 
using the apparent reasoning of the trial judge that Mrs. Stone did not have to establish 
that giving notice of the planned move as required by the statute was necessary then Mr. 
Stone did not have to establish a change of custody was essential See In re Marriage of 
LaMusga, 32 Cal. 4th 1072 (2004) which held the noncustodial parent bears the initial 
burden of showing that the proposed relocation of the children's residence would cause 
detriment to the children, requiring a reevaluation of the children's custody. 
The California Court considered the likely impact of the proposed move on the 
noncustodial parent's relationship with the children as a relevant factor in determining 
whether the move would cause detriment to the children and, when considered in light of 
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all of the relevant factors, may be sufficient to justify a change in custody. If the 
noncustodial parent makes such an initial showing of detriment, the court must perform 
the delicate and difficult task of determining whether a change in custody is in the best 
interests of the children. Mr. Stone was not given the opportunity to make such a showing 
in an evidentiary hearing. 
When a parent moves away with the children, invariably there are impediments, 
some insurmountable, for the noncustodial parent wishing to maintain a close relationship 
with his children. The gravity of the trial court's decision mandates that Mr. Stone have a 
full opportunity to present, and the trial court have a full opportunity to consider, the 
relevant evidence 
This is a demand of due process, a demand that went unheeded by the trial court. It 
is widely recognized that "[a] parent has a fundamental right, protected by the 
Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 
(Utah 1982). The demands of due process rest on the concept "of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties 
involved." Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting 
Rupp v. Grantsville City,610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). "One of the fundamental 
requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." Mr. Stone was not afforded 
this opportunity by the trial court throughout this proceeding 
Not only were Mr. Stone's due process rights to be heard ignored the trial court 
also failed to apply procedural due process by ignoring U. C. A § 30-3-5 which deals 
with the disposition of property, maintenance and health care of parties and children, and 
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the division of debts. The statute provides that when a decree of a decree divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The trial court shall include in every decree of divorce 
an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children, and if insurance coverage is or becomes 
available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children. 
Pursuant to U. C. A. Section 15-4-6.5 it is mandatory that there is an order specifying 
which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage, an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors, regarding the court's division of debts and provisions for the 
enforcement of these orders; and provisions for income withholding in accordance with 
Title 62A, Chapter 11. In this case there was no provision made for the payment of the 
parties property taxes, maintenance or the mortgage payments, or a designation of the 
party responsible for payment. 
It has been recognized in Utah since 1852, that minors in the Territory and State of 
Utah have not had the legal capacity to sue. See 1876 Compiled Laws of Utah 345; Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-2-1. Today, Rule 17(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes 
the legal incapacity of minors by requiring a minor who is a party to a lawsuit to "appear 
either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by 
the court in which the action is pending." The trial court is specifically authorized by 
UCA 30-3-11.2. to appoint counsel for child "[I]f, in any action . . . involving the custody 
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or support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have a separate 
exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, the court may appoint 
counsel to represent the child throughout the action. There is no statute that denies 
children the right to more than one attorney to represent their interests or wishes. 
The award of attorney fees against Mr. Stone was improper. The decision to award 
attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Kellev v. Kellev, 2000 UT App 236, P30, 9 P.3d 171. In order to recover attorney 
fees in a divorce action, the moving party must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating that 
the award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of the requesting party 
compels the award. The relevant factors for determining the reasonableness of the request 
include, the necessity for the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate 
charged in light of the difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates 
commonly charged for similar services in the community. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 
P.2d 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court has "inherent power" to award attorney 
fees to "'compensate for delay, inconvenience and the expense resulting from [a party's] 
behavior.'" Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78^14, 985 P.2d 255 (citation omitted); see also 
Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (stating trial courts "possess 
certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct 
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases through the court."). The award of 
attorneys fees in this case where one party has incurred fees in excess of $100,000.00 
while the other party has demonstrated his poverty is ridiculous on its face. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1, 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding notice of 
Appelees move complied with U.C.A. § 30-3-37, in concluding that 23 
days notice of the Appelee's move to California complied with the 60 
day notice provision of the relocation statute and denied the Appellant 
due process by failing to make the appropriate orders regarding 
parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation as required by 
the statute. 
The Utah Supreme court has stated that the ,f[P]rimary goal in interpreting statutes 
is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, P 11, 
100 P.3d 1171. "It is presumed that the legislature used each word advisedly and gives 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 
1999 UT 35, P 9, 977 P.2d 479. The plain language of the statute is read as a whole, and 
the court interprets "its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, P 17, 66 P.3d 592. Only when the court 
finds that a statute is ambiguous does it look to other interpretive tools such as legislative 
history. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, P 8, 108 P.3d 725. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37(1) states in the pertinent part that "when either parent 
decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the residence specified 
in the court's decree, that parent shall provide if passible 60 days advance written notice 
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of the intended relocation to the other parent. . ." (Emphasis added) Mrs. Stone delivered 
her notice to Mr. Stone on September 7, 2005 at the end of a two page letter dealing with 
other matters and giving him a mere 23 days notice of her intention to move the children 
to California [Addendum at ]. 
A. The September 7, 2005 notice is defective, it fails to satisfy the express 
requirements of the relocation statute. 
It is incomprehensible that in a divorce proceeding as rancorous and contentious as 
this one that Mrs. Stone would choose to give notice of her impending move in such a 
haphazard and ineffective way let alone fail to comply with the letter of the statute by 
providing the required 60 day notice. Instead of complying strictly with the statute, which 
given the circumstances of this litigation would only be reasonable, Mrs. Stone chose 
instead to attempt to deprive Mr. Stone of a meaningful right to respond as well as 
virtually guaranteeing that the matter would be the subject of further litigation. 
The notice is defective on its face. It was placed at the very end of a two page 
letter from Mrs. Stone's counsel Brent Chipman to Mr. Stone's counsel at the time Mary 
Corporon... No where in the heading, or in the introductory paragraph or the front page of 
the letter was Mr. Stone alerted that the letter was intended to serve as notice under 
U.C.A. §30-3-37 of Mrs. Stone's impending move. 
The letter failed to cite the relocation statute. Instead, it merely stated, "This is my 
client's notice under the statute that she intends to move with the children on October 1 
2005." It could be argued that the language "under the statute," is sufficient and had the 
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rest of the letter strictly complied with the statute then possibly the letter could be 
deemed to confer proper notice. 
However, UCA §30-3-37(1) states the written notice of relocation shall contain 
statements affirming the following: (a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a 
schedule approved by both parties will be followed and (b) neither parent will interfere 
with the other's parental rights pursuant to court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the 
schedule approved by both parties. Merely parroting the language of the statute is not 
enough to comply with the intent of statute which requires positive assurance that the 
parties genuinely intend to comply with the statute. 
The first sentence of the September 7, 2005 letter states, counsel is enclosing 
"Objections to the proposed Supplemental findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
to the proposed Supplemental Decree," indicating there was not an agreement in place. 
Mrs. Stone's claim that she would follow the terms of a yet to be agreed to parenting plan 
that was to be incorporated into a yet to be agreed to supplemental decree does not satisfy 
the plain language of the statute requiring an affirmation of the intent to comply. Indeed, 
the failure of the parties to agree to a parenting plan is one of the reasons the litigation 
has been so protracted. 
The fact that the notice fails to properly address the parent time provisions may 
have been one of the reasons the trial court erred by failing to make appropriate orders 
regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation as discussed below. 
B. The September 7, 2005 letter fails to satisfy the express 60 day notice 
requirements of the relocation statute 
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The justification that Mrs. Stone gives in the letter for ignoring the 60 day notice 
provision was because, "She is faced with the elimination of all future increases to her 
income unless she obtains a four year degree.... she has therefore determined to move to 
California." 
The letter containing the purported notice came to the attention of Judge Medley 
on September 305 2005 during the course of his review of the grandparent's petition for 
grandparent's rights and a temporary restraining order. As a result of the concerns he had 
concerning the sufficiency of the notice he entered an order preventing the children from 
being moved from the State of Utah until a relocation hearing could be held pursuant to 
UCA §30-3-37(2). At the hearing held October 6, 2005 the trial court stated that "this 
hearing has a very narrow purpose and I want to make it clear that we are conducting this 
hearing consistent with Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37 and its subparts...' [Transcript of Oct 
6, 2005 relocation hearing; page 1 lines 9-12]. 
The trial court reviewed the plain language of the statute and observed "I think 
there's a preference that the notice be 60 days if possible, and if its going to be shorter 
than 60 days then if we follow the language of the statute it needs to be impossible to 
give a 60 day notice." [Oct 5 2005 Transcript [^1 §9-12]. The court went on to observe 
that when it read the letter from Mr. Chipman the court could not come to the conclusion 
that it was impossible to give a sixty day notice. [Oct 5 2005 Transcript {^57 §21-25 [^58 
§1-7] 
Mrs. Stone was simply unable to get around the simple fact at the relocation 
hearing that it was not impossible to give the sixty day notice. Instead her counsel fell 
36 
back to a best interest of the child argument and the trial court accepted his argument in 
error. Not because the best interest argument does not permeate the entire divorce 
proceeding but as the court itself observed , "[t]his hearing has a very narrow purpose and 
I want to make it clear that we are conducting this hearing consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-37 and its subparts...5 [Transcript of Oct 6, 2005 relocation hearing; page 1 
lines 9-12]. 
C. The court misapplied the relocation statute by conducting a best interest's 
analysis instead of applying the statute. 
In exercising its discretion in child custody matters the trial court should be guided 
at all times by the best interests of the child. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). However, conducting a best interest analysis does not supplant the 
requirement that the relocation statute be complied with. It is assumed that legislature is 
keenly aware of mandate it has given the Courts of this state to act in the best interests of 
the child in custody matters. 
The statute is straight forward on its face and does not to contemplate a best 
interest analysis filter in determining the legal question of whether it has been complied 
with. The excuse that Mrs. Stone uses that for giving 23 days notice was because she 
needed to relocate to find another job simply does not meet the mandate of the plain 
language of the statute. It is difficult to rationalize how moving to California without a 
job waiting for her and without health insurance was in the best interests of the children. 
The provision for health insurance was vital but was ignored by the trial court as the 
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parties children suffer from heart, skin, and vision problems and now tragically the oldest 
has been diagnosed with ovarian cancer. 
It could be argued that the words "if possible" make the statute ambiguous. Only 
when the court finds that a statute is ambiguous does it look to other interpretive tools 
such as legislative history. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, P 8, 108 P.3d 725. 
The legislative history clearly shows the intent of the drafters to construct a notice 
statute and not to use the words "if possible" as a basis for a best interest's analysis. 
[Addendum 35 ]. For example the bills author states that he wanted a 90 day notification 
but after consultations compromised on 60 days. 
If the words "if possible" require a best interest analysis then the traditional 
analysis should be refined for cases of the relocation of the children in situations such as 
this to provide a more comprehensive analysis providing at a minimum the assurance of 
health insurance when a party relocated to another state without health insurance for the 
minor children. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that a traditional best interest 
analysis may not be sufficient when one parent seeks the move a couple's children 
hundreds of miles away. The Pennsylvania Supreme court has refined the traditional best 
interest analysis in Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. 1990). The Gruber case 
concerned an interstate relocation where a primary custodial parent sought to move from 
Pennsylvania to Illinois with her three children. Recognizing that relocations present 
unique issues, Gruber refined the standard best interest analysis and set out three prongs 
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that should be considered in relocation cases. The Gruber court held that in assessing the 
custodial parent's request to move, the trial judge should consider: 
1) the potential advantages of the proposed move and the likelihood that it would 
substantially improve the quality of life for the custodial parent and the children, 
including any non-economic factors that might contribute to happiness and well-being; 
2) the integrity of the motives of both parents, the one seeking to move and the 
one opposing the move; and 
3) the availability of realistic, substitute visitation arrangements to foster the 
ongoing relationship between the children and the non-custodial parent, with the caveat 
that the existing pattern of visitation need not be reproduced as each case will require a 
balancing of all interests. 
In this case there was a mother relocating three minor children without proper or at 
the very least very short notice to a destination hundreds of miles away. She did not have 
a job and in spite of the fact that her children had a history of serious health concerns she 
did not have health insurance. The custody evaluations and the standing order of the court 
was that it was not in the best interests of the children to remove them from school 
midterm but that was exactly what she did. The standing order of the court also provided 
for liberal visitation for Mr. Stone and the two youngest children were vehemently 
opposed to the move. This is hardly a recipe for substantially improving the quality of the 
children's lives. 
The motives for the move should have been suspect. Mrs. Stone told Mr. Stone 
that he would never see the children again and to date she has followed through on that 
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threat. Mr. Stone wanted to maintain the stable and loving home family and school 
environment the children enjoyed in Utah. 
As discussed below there was no attempt on the part of Mrs. Stone to provide 
visitation arrangements to foster the ongoing relationship between the children and the 
Mr. Stone she simply intended to prevent Mr. Stone from ever seeing the children again. 
D. The court misapplied the statute by failing to make provisions for visitation as 
required by the express language of the statute. 
The trial court as provided by UCA §30-3-37(2) on its own motion, scheduled the 
relocation hearing the purpose of which should have been (1) to review the notice of 
relocation and parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and (2) to make 
appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation. The 
trial court made absolutely no orders regarding parent-time and the costs for parent time 
transportation even though the three children were immediately moved to California and 
the costs of visitation were substantial. As a result of the move Mr. Stone has been unable 
to see the children since October 2005. 
The District Court failed to consider the costs of parent time transportation at the 
relocation hearing and later when Mr. Stone objected, the court elected to merely ignore 
such matters (12-12-05 hearing transcript page 69, line 14, and 2-8-06 hearing transcript 
page 109, 110, & 120). Without proper hearing by the court of the motions presented 
requesting the issue of visitation and travel expenses be resolved, the Appellant is unable 
to receive due process in this proceeding. Indeed, by successfully manipulating the 
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judicial process Mrs. Stone has held the children as virtual hostages in California with the 
express purpose of damaging the parental relationship between a father and his children. 
Mr. Stone has been harmed and denied personal parent time visitation with the 
parties5 children since October 4, 2005. Due to the fact the trial court made the order 
effective that day, he was not even able to say goodbye to his three children as Mrs. 
Stone was hiding them in Provo. Mrs. Stone continues refuse to provide the travel 
expenses for the children as provided by the statute Mr. Stone is not in any financial 
position to pay the travel expenses the Mrs. Stone is required to provide for the children. 
The trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirements regarding visitation so 
Mrs. Stone has assumed they do not apply to her and the statute is not binding upon the 
parties because of trial court error. 
The lack of frequent and meaningful visitation with the children is harmful to the 
relationship the children enjoyed with their father. The effects of much reduced parent 
time with the children and the further deterioration of the relationship caused by lack of 
visitation should not be allowed to be a defense for Mrs. Stone to use to continue to 
withhold visitation. Since August 3, 2005 when the District Court attempted to establish a 
binding stipulated agreement between the parties, the District Court has not found the 
Appellant in contempt for failure to pay the stipulated amount of child support. Thus, 
without a finding of contempt against the Appellant, the District Court erred in refusing 
to require Mrs. Stone to provide the children's travel costs to visit their father as provided 
by the statute. 
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During the December 12, 2005 hearing the Guardian ad litem recognized that the 
parties really did not have a structured and binding or clarified order specifying what the 
parties visitation or custody or parent time is or will be. 
The Appellant was prejudiced and inappropriately denied parent time visitation for 
Christmas 2005. At the December 12, 2005 hearing as the GAL stated in regards to the 
court allowing counsel to withdrawal at that time. "It's just going to throw a wrench in 
the works as to ... (parent time visitation with the children), ...but if we could just get 
into place the issues concerning my clients, (the children and their visitation/ custody) I 
can't imagine there are concerns that would not allow her (counsel Mary Corporon) to act 
in her client's interest regarding the time sharing issues". The court ignored the issue and 
so the Guardian ad litem on page 68, line # 24, states that nothing that had been filed had 
addressed the Parent Time schedule showing that the August 3, 2005 hearing did not 
have the parent time issues properly addressed at the hearing, nor did the order from the 
October 6, 2005 hearing properly address the parent time issues.. 
The whole page of 68 presents to the court by the Guardian ad litem her 
understanding that the court proceedings of both August 3, 2005 and October 
(September) were deficient as to what was needed to serve the best interests of the 
children. The proceedings and order were deficient in not having any Parent Time 
visitation schedule for the parties to be bound by or to provide for the needs of the 
children, and were not in effect or existed thus further supporting the Appellee's failure 
to comply with the required statutory requirements of the relocation statute. Thus further 
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supporting the Court's error in allowing the Appellee to relocate with the children to 
California. 
Furthermore, the Appellee, and the District Court were under false assumptions at 
the October 6, 2005 relocation hearing that Mrs. Stone had been validly or effectively 
granted custody of the children to be included in the relocation. The standing order of the 
court regarding both the children's custody and the parties divorce decree failed to grant 
custody of the children to the Mrs. Stone in the event of her relocation. Thus 
consideration of a parent time schedule that included the children coming to Utah to 
spend their time with the Appellant when in fact had the proper review of the evidence 
and implementation of the actual standing order of the court, would have a much 
different parent time visitation schedule of the time the children would have been out of 
school from their Utah standard school schedule (not off track, because their Utah 
schools were not year round schools) and the schedule would list the time the children 
would be going to California to visit the Appellee. Thus, had the District Court not erred 
as a matter of law and applied the incorrect statute to the facts, and had properly 
examined the evidence, a much different result would have occurred. 
Because the District Court erred in failing to evaluate the actions under existing 
court orders the District Court caused the Appellant to be prejudiced in any meaningful 
future attempts for justice for frequent and meaningful visits with his children, and due 
process until such time as the children are ordered to be returned to reside with the 
Appellant, and the compounding effects of the error of the court are remedied fully. 
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The District Court relied on a false and misleading representations of opposing 
counsel and incorrect and false assumptions rather than on the existing facts, and failed to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the best interests of the children before the trial court ruled 
the children were moved away. Had the court allowed consideration of facts and 
evidence on the best interests of the children in an evidentiary hearing the district court 
would have a much different determination. 
Since the August 3, 2005 hearing transcript fails to show where any travel related 
costs of the children for parent time visitation it is evident this issue was never discussed, 
considered, or negotiated by the parties. Thus, because the court's order of January 9, 
2005 contains a fabricated schedule of the travel costs that were not agreed to by the 
parties, this shows that the District Court erred as a matter of law by allowing such 
provisions to be added to the order without the agreement of the parties to modify it to be 
different than what was discussed and stipulated to on August 3, 2005, 
Since the District Court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether moving 
the children was in their best interests of the children, Due Process was not met, or 
allowed to the Appellant. 
POINT 2. 
Alternatively, if the relocation statute was complied with, then the trial 
court failed to properly apply the best interest analysis according to 
U.C.A. §§ 30-3-10 and 30-3-10.2 prior to allowing the relocation of 
children at the October 5, 2005 hearing. 
It is widely recognized that "[a] parent has a fundamental right, protected by the 
Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 
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(Utah 1982), see also Quilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246. 255. 98 S. Ct. 549. 554. 54 L. 
Ed. 2d 511 (1978). This "freedom of personal choice in matters of. . . family life is one 
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Quilloin. 434 U.S. at 255. 98 S. Ct. at 555 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see also In re S.A.. 2001 UT App 307. P12. 37 P.3d 1166 (recognizing parents' 
interest in the care, custody, and control of their children as a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
The demands of due process rest on the concept "of basic fairness of procedure 
and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." 
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. 
Grantsville City. 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). "One of the fundamental requisites of 
due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." Id. 
Before the court allowed the move at the relocation hearing it should have, in 
addition, to the provisions of the relocation statute, conducted an evidentiary hearing to 
allow Mr. Stone the opportunity to be heard under U. C. A. 30-3-10. This statute provides 
that in determining any form of custody the court shall consider the best interests of the 
child before relocating the children hundreds of miles away from their father. The move 
was an effective change in custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties; which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interest of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
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noncustodial parent, the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the 
depth, quality, and nature of the relationship between a parent and child 
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. Mrs. Stone had a long history of repeatedly refusing to allow Mr. 
Stone access to his children which has been borne out since the wrongful move by the 
fact that he has not seen the children since the move to California on October 5, 2005. In 
the almost 2 years since Mrs. Stone has failed to allow visitation with their father as the 
statute directs and allows showing her disdain for the law and disregard for the children's 
best interests 
When a parent moves away with the children, invariably there are impediments, 
some insurmountable, for the noncustodial parent wishing to maintain a close relationship 
with his children. The gravity of the trial court's decision mandates that Mr. Stone should 
have had the opportunity under the statutes noted above the right to be heard, the right to 
present evidence, and the trial court have a full opportunity to consider, the relevant 
evidence in this case, this simply was not done, starting with the express bias of the 
commissioner in stating his unwillingness to accept the testimony of experts that 
prompted Mr. Stone to file his March 4, 2005 objection and appeal of the commissioner's 
conduct. 
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Not only was the relocation hearing brought for the specific purpose of 
ascertaining whether the relocation statute had been complied with but the trial judge 
emphasized the narrow purpose of the hearing at the beginning of the proceeding. 
Mr. Stone had no notice that the court was prepared to order the immediate 
relocation of the children without even the opportunity to say goodbye to the children 
upon a finding that the relocation statute was complied with. The court failed to provide 
Mr. Stone with basic fairness. No matter how much the trial courts patience may have 
been tried by the many motions filed by Mr. Stone in his attempt to bring the myriad of 
unresolved issues to the courts attention in this matter, the court owed Mr. Stone basic 
due process and due process is not afforded to the Appellant by a trial court judge that 
admits later in the proceeding "I can't say to you that I have read every motion that has 
been filed. I at least read their title." 
POINT 3. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to require that a 
parenting plan was incorporated in the divorce decree as required by 
U.C.A.§30-3-10.8. 
U. C. A. §30-3-10.8. Provides that any party requesting joint custody, joint 
legal or physical custody, or any other type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file 
and serve a proposed parenting plan at the time of the filing of their original petition or at 
the time of filing their answer or counterclaim. This statutory mandate was not complied 
with, the parties throughout the course of the proceeding and up until today have been 
unable to agree on a parenting plan. Mr. Stone tried to enlist the assistance of Dr. Davis 
or Dr. Stewart to prepare a parenting plan that was deemed by the professionals to be in 
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the best interests of the children but Ms. Stone refused to cooperate. And even went so far 
as to fire Dr. Davis without court approval to prevent the implementation of a plan. A 
parenting plan was not included in the initial pleadings, it was not adopted in the 
numerous recommendations of the commissioner, it was not in existence at the time of 
the relocation hearing and it was not incorporated into the supplemental decree entered 
January 9, 2006 even though on October 8, 2004 the court was told it needed to be and it 
was not. 
Mr. Stone objected over and over again that there was no parenting plan in 
existence but his objections and pleas to the court went unheeded. The Commissioner on 
several occasions entered orders stating that a plan should be adopted but it never was. 
Had it been adopted the issues relating to dispute resolution and relocation could have 
been properly addressed but they were not due to the error of the court in ignoring the 
statute. 
U. C. A. 30-3-10.9 Requires provisions for resolution of future disputes between 
the parents, allocation of decision-making authority, and residential provisions for the 
child, and provisions addressing notice and parent-time responsibilities in the event of the 
relocation of either party be included in any decree. There was no agreement between the 
parties on any of these required provisions in the stipulation imposed on the parties by the 
trial judge on August 3, 2005 and at the relocation hearing on October 6, 2005. In fact the 
trial Judge's order denied the Appellant's attempt to mediate the issues and should be 
overturned. There were no findings of fact to support the objectives of a parenting plan in 
providing for the physical care of the three children, in maintaining their emotional 
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stability, in providing for the children's changing needs as they grow and mature in a way 
that minimizes the need for future modifications to the parenting plan, there are no 
provisions setting forth the authority and responsibilities of each parent with respect to 
each of the children, and in minimizing the children's exposure to harmful parental 
conflict and the mandate to encourage the parents to meet the responsibilities to their 
minor children through agreements in the parenting plan rather than relying on judicial 
intervention was totally ignored as evidenced by the Petitioners more than $97,000.00 
attorneys bill and the protracted litigation in this matter. And finally there was never an 
evidentiary hearing aimed at protecting the best interests of the children, there were only 
judicial pronouncements that the best interests of the children were being protected but 
there was nothing procedurally done to protect those interests. There was no evidentiary 
hearing to show substantial proof of what was in the best interests of the children just 
false and misleading statements by Mrs. Stone's high paid counsel. 
U. C. A. 30-3-10.9 (4) specifically requires the dispute resolution process be set 
out in the final decree and include provisions stating that preference shall be given to the 
provisions in the parenting plan, the parents shall use the designated process to resolve 
disputes relating to implementation of the plan, except those related to financial support, 
unless an emergency exists, a written record shall be prepared of any agreement reached 
in counseling or mediation and provided to each party, if arbitration becomes necessary, 
a written record shall be prepared and a copy of the arbitration award shall be provided to 
each party, if the court finds that a parent has used or frustrated the dispute resolution 
process without good reason, the court may award attorney's fees and financial sanctions 
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to the prevailing parent and the district court shall have the right of review from the 
dispute resolution process. 
Finally, if a parent fails to comply with a provision of the parenting plan or a child 
support order, the other parent's obligations under the parenting plan or the child support 
order are not affected. Failure to comply with a provision of the parenting plan or a child 
support order may result in a finding of contempt of court. Mr. Stone sought a finding of 
contempt against Mrs. Stone in light of the ongoing patter of refusal to negotiate the 
terms of the decree and failure to provide visitation with the only result being the unjust 
assessment of attorney fees. 
Mr. Stone bought numerous motions before both the commissioner and the trial 
court drawing their attention to the fact that the parenting plan did not exist and the 
relevant statutes were not complied with but his attempts were repeatedly ignored which 
is clearly erroneous as a matter of law on the trial courts part. Instead of resolving the 
issues that had dragged on and on without resolution, the trial court merely assessed 
attorney fees in an attempt to shot him up. 
POINT 4. 
The failure of the district court to comply with UCA §30-3-5(l)a-d in 
the final order denied the Appellant due process. 
Not only was the fundamental premise of fairness violated in regard to Mr. Stone's 
children, the statutory provisions for the disposition of the property and the division of 
debts were not fulfilled. U. C. A § 30-3-5 in its pertinent parts deals with the disposition 
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of property, maintenance and health care of parties and children, and the division of 
debts. The statute provides that when a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The trial court shall include in every decree of divorce an order assigning 
responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses 
of the dependent children, and if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a 
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, 
hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children. In the October 2005 
relocation failed to even address health insurance allowing the move to occur without 
coverage. Pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5 it is mandatory that there is an order specifying 
which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage, an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors, regarding the court's division of debts and provisions for the 
enforcement of these orders; and provisions for income withholding in accordance with 
Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services and the Aug 3, 2005 settlement hearing never 
addressed the ORS provisions or assessment of fees against Mr. Stone. 
This divorce action was filed by the Appellee on June 23, 2001 and Mr. Stone 
filed a counter claim listing the following issues which remain unresolved as issues of 
this appeal. 
Because of the unconventional financing that was able to be obtained on the 
parties three properties' the court has been led to think something suspicious has 
happened. However, the District Court refused to hear or review evidence about the legal 
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financing arrangements in question. Additionally, as Mrs. Stone so aptly recognized in 
her sworn deposition of October 2001, throughout the patties' marriage, financing 
opportunities were made available by all four parents of the parties or from personal 
family friends. The trial court refused to address joint funds and premarital property that 
were included in Mr. Stone's initial filing 
All the current financing matters that the trial court failed to review evidence on, 
but just acted as though they thought were suspicious, were all properly developed by 
attorneys or officers of the court, or bank loan officers in their official banking capacity, 
and disclosed in court as well as timely and properly recorded and or executed by other 
standard conventional lending institutions as well as were "arms length" transactions as 
best could be done with family members that were the only source of funding available to 
the Appellant. 
Because this divorce action has become very time consuming, there were many 
regular monthly bills that became due each month or each year that still needed to be 
paid, even though the prior temporary orders of the court were deficient, or ambiguous as 
to how the joint marital regularly occurring bills were to be paid. Business entities are 
entitled to seek their rightful payments against the contracted parties despite the 
deficiency of court orders. The trial court failed to uphold legal and binding contracts 
involving Mr. and Mrs. Stone and in fact ordered they did not have to be complied with 
thus improperly attempting to rewrite a parties legal contract with the parties. 
In order to meet many of these ongoing financial obligations, because the trial 
court failed to provide otherwise in their orders, the Mr. Stone was in need of additional 
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financial resources. However, the only financial asset Mr. Stone was able to draw on, 
was the properties that were owned and disclosed in the parties' financial disclosures 
filed in July 2001 with their respective applicable financial obligations disclosed as well. 
On March 31, 2004, the trial court had ordered that the Mr. Stone alone was able 
to take a loan out on the parties' property to pay some of the financial expenses incurred 
up to that date. However, because the properties had both parties on the title, Mr. Stone 
was unable to obtain any financing from conventional banking or lending institutions. 
Only one conventional lender willing to take on such financial risk and was approved by 
Countrywide Home loans (who had originally held the loan on the property), but the Mrs. 
Stone refused to agree to sign the applicable documentation. Mrs. Stone tried, by failing 
to comply with the order of the court, to place Mr. Stone in extraordinary financial 
hardship. 
Thus, the Appellant had to seek non conventional financing. The only other 
available source for such financing was by Annabelle Stone with her stellar credit report 
rating, taking out loans on property she owned free and clear of anyone else. Thus money 
was made available to pay off delinquent mortgage obligations, and prevent the 
properties from being lost to foreclosure. 
Ultimately, the effects of incomplete or ambiguous or irregular court proceedings, 
has caused Annabelle Stone to pay off over $300,000.00 of joint marital debt that was not 
properly addressed or ruled on making accommodation for her to be paid back before the 
properties are sold. Thus, without the clarification that Annabelle Stone would be 
properly paid off with applicable interest for her efforts, Annabelle Stone felt selling the 
53 
properties without such clarification or established value amounts was a misapplication 
of justice, as well as for her to experience unjust financial loss. 
Because of the valiant efforts of Annabelle Stone, the children could return to 
reside in their former Utah residence if the relocation is overturned even though Mrs. 
Stone has abandoned the residence and has refused to pay the mortgage, as well as any of 
the parties properties which still remain available for property distribution should the trial 
court be required to address the issue as provided by statute. However, the Appellee fails 
to recognize the gifts and benefits that Annabelle Stone has provided her, or even 
appreciate the negative credit report implications that were not placed on her credit 
report, because of the financial payments made by Annabelle Stone, and merely 
attempted to fraudulently gain one half ownership interest in the sales price of every 
property that was paid off by Annabelle Stone at full face value. The Appellee has 
continuingly attempted to be unjustly enriched and to take advantage of Annabelle Stone. 
The Appellee further tries to take advantage of the passage of time that has caused the 
joint marital debt not to be properly disposed of by the courts in the order from the date 
of the divorce of September 11, 2003 to be unjustly enriched by the inflated property 
values occurring as a result of the passage of time due to Mrs. Stones delay and 
intransigence in settling this matter. 
Furthermore, the Mrs. Stone attempts to be unjustly enriched by taking advantage 
of the ambiguous terms of the Order from August 3, 2005. Mrs. Stone attempts to have 
or receive something that she has failed to pay for. That is one half of the three separate 
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paid off properties, without having to pay one half of the bills for those same three 
properties. 
The Appellee attempts to get the court to give her one half of the equity of the two 
paid off properties, disregarding the amounts related to those properties that had been 
paid off by Annabelle Stone during the course of these divorce proceedings and were not 
addressed by the court for their final order. 
A great deal of time has passed since the Appellee filed for divorce, and a great 
deal of time has passed since the trial court ordered the children to be moved away. It is 
of great concern, that justice is tainted or denied because of or by the passage of time, and 
the Mrs. Stone seeks to use such passage of time for her continued benefit or advantage. 
It is settled law that the issues, matters, or items to be adjudicated in a divorce 
proceeding, are the issues that existed at the time of filing of the action. There were 
many issues, or matters that existed at the time of filing of this Divorce action that have 
not been resolved by the court's order from the parties August 3, 2005 hearing, and 
subsequent rulings that remain unresolved. Review of the transcript from August 3, 2005 
shows on page 3, line 23, only claims for Attorney fees, daycare costs, and alleged 
arrearage of child support claims were released by the parties. However, the order from 
August 3, 2005 failed to resolve all of the issues that had arisen through the passage of 
time since the parties married or the Divorce action was filed. Many of the existing 
amounts due were still needing to be paid as the time passed by since the divorce action 
was filed. The Appellant should not have had to face payment of all the amounts due, 
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and still the Appellee enjoy the benefit of all such debts paid by someone other than 
herself Just because of the passage of time. 
The District Court's ruling fails to distinguish between mortgage liability, and title 
ownership. Even though the Order from the August 3, 2005 appears to solve some of the 
above matters, with the wording addressing "mortgages", it fails to address already paid 
amounts that are no longer "mortgages", but were amounts due from the Appellant and 
the Appellee at the time of the Divorce filing. Neither does the Order from August 3, 
2005 have provision for payment of the other amounts specified above, or the payment of 
interest for such time or from such time amounts were due, and paid or not paid. 
The Court also appears to disregard that no matter how the money was obtained 
for any of the amounts specified above, either from funds from banks, or from private 
lenders, the amounts paid were to be credited toward what the Appellant paid or caused 
to be paid on joint marital debts during the period the divorce proceedings were 
transpiring. If the funds came from a banking institution after the date of separation, the 
trial court would not seek to bind the lending institution as a party in the divorce action 
between the parties so such practice to attempt to force Annabelle Stone a non party to 
this action to be bound by the divorce decree is incorrect. 
Additionally the order fails to address what party is responsible for the sale of the 
property. It was well known at the August 3, 2005 hearing, that the Mr. Stone did not 
own the properties in question at that time, yet the order specifies that he should sell 
property that he does not own. Selling property that one does not own is an act of fraud 
and it is improper for a trial court to require a party to engage in an act of fraud. The 
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Order attempts to require Annabelle Stone to sell the properties in question, and yet the 
trial court fails to have jurisdiction over Annabelle Stone, since she is not a party to the 
divorce action. 
Because issues are ambiguous, there exists much possibility for confusion and 
extended litigation, and a reversal of such Order is only appropriate. 
Because several matters had not been resolved by the August 3, 2005 court 
proceedings, that the Appellant filed many motions with the court to resolve such other 
pending issues, and it was the same motions seeking resolution that the District Court 
erred by saying were merit-less, and thus assessed the Appellant with the attorney fee 
assessment that is a matter of this appeal. 
Thus pre-marital property could be returned to the Appellant, and was not. 
The trial court committed plain error by incorrectly interpreting applicable statutes 
in deciding the issues of this case. Because of such deficiencies in he orders of the court, 
Mr. Stone, the three children and Annabelle Stone have been irreparably harmed The trial 
court has failed to uphold many previously issued and standing orders of the court, and 
because of such, the parties were caused to suffer a lack of Due Process. 
The trial court issued what it felt was a Final Order that failed to resolve all 
pending issues between the parties. The order was prepared differently than the court 
proceedings show. Because the trial court is in error thinking a Final Order had been 
issued, the trial court has failed to allow correction of the errors, or other related matters 
from being resolved before the court. Because of such, the parties have been caused to 
suffer loss and harm, and lack of Due Process. 
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POINT 5. 
The District Court failed to timely address the Appellant's March 4, 
2005 Appeal/objections to Commissioner Casey's recommendations 
and therefore denied him due process. 
A fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard. Mr. 
Stone in spite of filing a myriad of motions seeking the right to be heard was ultimately 
not heard. 
The trial judge failed to address issues needing resolution and which needed to be 
addressed in Mr. Stones March 2005 Appeal/Objection in a timely manner, instead of 
waiting for over one year. At the time Mr. Stone filed the March 2005 appeal/objection, 
he was not able to obtain, or afford counsel to properly pursue the appeal/objection to the 
proceedings that had transpired in Commissioner Casey's court. The Third District Court 
attempted to push to the parties to trial without even hearing the facts, issues, or 
enforcing the Court's previously issued orders. Therefore, Mrs. Stone was allowed to 
gain great personal advantage or benefit by not complying with the previously issued 
Court Orders. 
An Order that fails to adjudicate completely all the issues of the parties fails to be 
considered a final order.. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1991). Thus the 
order of January 9, 2006 is not final because the issues were not completely adjudicated 
in the order. The Petitioner's counsel used the misrepresentation of fact to his clients 
advantage in even misleading the court to believe on October 6, 2005, that a Final Order 
between the parties existed, when in fact, a Final Order did not exist at that time, or 
anytime up to the Court's attempt to make the March 10, 2006 Minute Entry a Final 
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Order. The Petitioner's counsel has made inaccurate and false and misleading 
representations to the court for the trial court so that it was led to believe that a Final 
Order existed in the hearings held on August 3, 2005, on October 6, 2005, on December 
12, 2005, February 8, 2006, and other times. Appellee's counsel influenced the court to 
deem issues moot, when in fact they had not been finally resolved. 
Because the court failed to uphold its prior court orders, and the court failed to 
allow the Mr. Stone due process, he was not able to prepare an adequate defense or 
presentation of the issues for trial, or evidence to the court. Appellant admits that hind 
sight, with experienced counsel, he would have offered a differently worded objection in 
March 2005, but the trial court should have understood substance over form when the in 
pro se filings, from a party unable to afford and be represented by counsel. 
Instead of properly dealing with the March 2005 Appeal/Objection, the District 
Court just failed to recognize it was even filed, and went so far as to ridicule the 
Appellant when the Appellant even referred to it in subsequent hearings. Mrs. Stone 
responded to the Appeal in March 11, 2005 which is odd if it was actually a "phantom 
appeal" as suggested by her counsel. The trial court contributed to the degrading and miss 
application of justice when the court allowed and participated in belittling and making 
fun of Mr. Stone when the court referred to the March 2005 Appeal as "The Appellant's 
PHANTOM Appeal" in the hearings the court held in January 2006. The trial court 
committed prejudicial error in not dealing with the recorded March 2005 
Appeal/objection, until March 2006. 
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Although he Appellant's March 2005 Appeal/Objection that was presented to the 
trial court may have been crudely prepared, and submitted by an unlearned man, the 
significance of each paragraph is as follows, and is not a mere objection to a scheduling 
Conference that Judge Medley attempts to lead one to believe in his Minute Entry of 
March 10, 2006. Every one of the Appeal's first nine paragraphs was direct objections to 
past matters that were inappropriately advancing to trial without due process. 
The March 2005 Appeal/Objection lists many issues that have not been fully and 
properly adjudicated in any of the orders of the court. By ignoring the March 2005 
Appeal/Objection for over a year, the issues did not go away, simply because the court 
failed to adjudicate the issues fully. 
Judge Medley in his Minute Entry of March 10, 2006, Judge attempts to downplay 
the March 2005 Appeal/Objection as a mere objection to a scheduling conference, and 
yet that is not the case. It was an objection to advancing the issues forward for trial 
without resolving the issues that needed to be corrected or appealed beforehand. 
By denying any determination of the March 2005 Appeal, the Court, acting under 
color of state title, denied Mr. Stone and the children their U.S., and Utah Constitutional 
protections of Due Process, and defending rights to property, life, happiness, and 
reputation. Additionally, these actions of trial court denied the parties to their 
fundamental right to proper legal representation of their choice, or abilities to provide 
such for themselves. 
The following matters apply to the individually identified paragraphs of the March 
4, 2005 Appeal that the Third District Court failed to properly adjudicate: 
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Paragraph #1: This Paragraph states that there was an issue of who the court 
treated as the parties to this divorce action. This paragraph questions if the party's 
children are parties to their parents divorce action. The Court allowed one of the children 
of these parties (Brittney) to have standing in the divorce action to sue her Father for 
something caused by the action of her Mrs. Stone. The Court, as matter of important legal 
principal needed to determine as to the constitutionally protected right of the father not to 
be sued by his daughter in the divorce action started by the wife. This may seem so 
insignificant, that the Appellate Court feels like refraining from even discussing the 
matter, because it is considering children's videos and the value is small. However, it is 
the legal precedence that the Guardian ad Litem was trying to establish, of being able to 
paint the Father negatively to the court. Such a defense of my reputation and my 
property, or the property of our children was our Utah Constitutional right. The Third 
District Court under color of title denied me and our children the right to defend our 
property. The Third District Court under color of title denied me the right to defend my 
reputation against improper prosecution, slander, and unjust enrichment of another at my 
expense. Furthermore, the Third District Court denied the accountability of Mrs. Stone's 
actions to be properly accounted for and properly placed. Additionally, the Third District 
Court assumed that property that was provided by the parents for the children was 
allowed to be converted to the personal property of one child at the expense of the other 
two children of the same family. The Court failed to define what a child's property is, 
and who has the right to such ownership when the court allowed one of our daughters to 
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seek court action against me in this divorce action, for what property my Wife had given, 
and instructed, and ordered me to take from the marital residence to begin with. 
This Appeal attempts to seek definition as to who has standing in a divorce action. 
Failure by the Court to properly address the issue, made this court action a "free for All" 
that was only allowed to advance the position of the Mrs. Stone at the expense of Mr. 
Stone the parties children. The Court recognized the constitutional rights of one person, 
and violated the Constitutional rights of the other parties. When it came to considering 
the Constitutional rights of another child involved and affected in these proceedings, the 
Court discriminated unjustly against the children. The Third District Court seemed to act 
such that if the items cost minimal, you could seek counsel of your choice to assist you, 
and direct the court to act on your own interest at the expense of someone else, but if the 
transaction might include a greater amount, then that proceeding was not allowed. Yet 
Justice is no respecter of economic status, as held by the court so many other times. 
POINT 6. 
The January 9, 2006 Order is not a valid Final Order because the 
parties did not agree to it. 
When reviewing [trial court determinations regarding the custody of children], the 
Appellate Court must do its own weighing and make its own decision based on the facts 
in the record. Nevertheless, the [trial] court is allowed a considerable latitude of 
discretion in child custody matters, and its judgment will not be disturbed unless the 
Appellate Court determine the [trial] court has exceeded the scope of permitted discretion 
or has acted contrary to law." Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225, P6, 29 P.3d 676 . 
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Furthermore, '"matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which we 
review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's 
interpretation."' State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, P8, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. 
Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, P4, 18 P.3d 504), cert, denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002). 
Normally, the parties to a divorce are bound by their agreements. "It is the 
established rule that a stipulation pertaining to matters of divorce . . . and property rights 
therein, though advisory upon the court and would usually be followed unless the court 
thought it unfair or unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the court anyway. It is 
only a recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable." 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975). See also Nunlev v. Nunlev, 757 P. 2d 
473, 475 (Utah App. 1988), Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1983), Naylor 
v. Navlor, 563 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977). 
The District Court abused it's discretion in accepting and entering an order 
seeking to bind a party, Annabelle Stone, that the District Court lacks jurisdiction over as 
noted in the August 3, 2005 hearing transcript. (Page 28, line #8, page 26, Line 19, page 
23, line # 2). Annabelle Stone is not a party to the divorce action. However, the District 
Court sought to have Annabelle Stone bound by the order. As the transcript shows on 
Page 28, line # 6, Judge Medley stated: "as far as I'm concerned, this matter is settled and 
resolved." Such a statement, from the court, further demonstrates the District Court's pre-
determined mindset to not even consider any filings by the Appellant to resolve other 
pending matters where the Order of January 9, 2006 was deficient. The fact of the court 
lacked jurisdiction over Annabelle Stone was pointed out to the court prior to entering of 
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judgment on many different occasions as well as the Appellant's December 23, 2006 
filed "Notice of lack of jurisdiction." The fact that the January 9, 2006 order lacked 
jurisdiction over Annabelle Stone was shown in the January 9, 2006 transcript page 82, 
line #14. Yet the Court has made up, or pre-determined the issue without even hearing of 
the evidence. This however, is completely contrary to what Judge Medley stated on page 
just two pages earlier, on page 26, line # 1 1 , where the Court stated: "I obviously can't 
force a stipulation on the parties" as the court was trying to Bind Annabelle Stone to this 
Order. The trial court incorrectly attempts to bind Annabelle Stone to the August 3, 2005 
stipulation and subsequent Order of January 9, 2006. Therefore, the District Court's 
order of January 9, 2005 should be vacated in its entirety and the children returned to 
Utah to reside with their father and the case remanded back to the trial court for a hearing 
on the facts and consideration of the evidence. 
The District Court erred by changing the agreement of the parties without holding 
an evidentiary hearing or allowing proper consideration of evidence on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel before judgment was issued. The Appellant was prejudiced by the 
District Court's action of allowing counsel for the Appellant to withdraw less than thirty 
days before entry of the order on January 9, 2006. 
Another reason the parties January 9, 2006 Order must be vacated, reversed, and 
set aside, is that the Order as it is written by counsel Brent Chipman is not as it was 
presented in the court on August 3, 2005, in that Mr. Chipman has added several things in 
order to cause Benefit for his client the Appellee, that were NOT a part of the original 
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court proceeding of August 3, 2005. Some such "additions" made to the Order to cause 
benefit, or favor with the court for the Appellee, are as follows: 
Nowhere in the transcript from the August 3, 2005 court proceedings was it 
stipulated and agreed to that the Appellant was to have the ORS collection fees for each 
check that ORS processes for the Appellee, was to be taken from the Appellant's portion 
of fees remitted. Previously, the ORS fee was deducted from the Appellee's portion she 
received, because it was her desire and actions that caused ORS to be involved in the first 
place for collecting of said funds back in April 2002. There was no stipulation to such 3,000 ** 
fee being paid by the Appellant, either whole or half the fee. *£ f i 
The Court transcript fails to show where the stipulation for the Appellee to pay the 
Travel Expenses forHwo visits the Appellant per calendar year would have with the 
parties' children, because it was not represented in the negotiations, and not a part of the 
court proceedings. The Appellee paying fortwo visits per calendar year was never part 
of the representations made or stipulated to by the parties, or even the transcript. 
In regards to the negotiations, the idea of the children being moved away was 
never represented as happening until some great time in the future, after a finding that it 
was in their best interests to move. That has never happened, the move away aspect was 
just thrown in by Brent Chipman on the record at the end, so as to sneak it in for the 
Appellee's own benefit later. Even the Guardian ad litem expressed that they would 
withdraw after six months, since nothing was expected to happen that warranted their 
involvement. 
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From the court proceedings of August 3, 2005 that the January 9, 2006 order was 
to originate from it appears there may only be an implied agreement, not an express 
agreement. Resolution of divorce matters require a valid and binding expressed 
agreement between only the divorcing parties not non parties 
The courts resolve the issues between the parties that existed at the time of filing 
the action, and that the passage of time should not remove such duty of the court to 
resolve all issues pending at the time of filing of Divorce. The District Court failed to 
protect the interests of the parties' creditors, and failed to uphold legally binding 
contracts the parties had entered into and existed at the time of filing this divorce action. 
Furthermore, the District Court is required to value all properties at the date of 
divorce or date of separation. The parties were separated on June 1, 2001. The parties 
were divorced September 11, 2003, as the records have shown. 
The District Court erred in accepting as a Final Order based on a unagreed to 
stipulation presented by counsel Brent Chipman to the court as "there is no deal unless he 
gets his money first" as is shown at the August 3, 2005 hearing and shown in the 
transcript in the following: 
1. Page 24, line 3 "...we don't have a deal if the $40,000.00 is not divided as 
agreed.. .that was negotiated". 
2. Page 24, line # 2 1 , "...his position is that if this sale doesn't go through 
there, there is no deal". Specifically showing the court was aware of such self serving 
nature of counsel as to obstruct justice for his client so he could benefit. 
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3. Page 23, line # 10, "our agreement with Mr. Stone was premised on the fact 
... Annabelle Stone (the non-bound third party) list the properties". So $35,000.00 of sale 
funds could be delivered for Mr. Chipman's benefit all the while all other funds were to 
be held in escrow page 5, line #4) until all other issues of the outside case between the 
Appellee and Annabelle Stone could be resolved. Thus not even Mr. Chipman's client 
was going to receive any funds from this agreement, it had to be resolved in another case 
where Mr. Chipman may, or may not be the attorney for the Appellee. It had not been 
determined by the court that Mr. Chipman or Annabelle Stone were parties to this divorce 
action. Thus, the District Court further errored on these matters. 
4. Page 23, line # 15, "If she (referring to Annabelle Stone) doesn't sell the 
properties, then I don't think we have a settlement". 
The District Court abused it's discretion in allowing unjust benefit to Mr. 
Chipman and to unjust cost to Annabelle Stone whom both are not parties to the divorce 
action. The District Court abused it's discretion in signing the January 9, 2006 order 
(without holding a proper hearing of evidence and finding of facts, because of the 
subsequent events as to what was shown in the August 3, 2005 hearing to need to occur if 
such stipulations that were agreed to were not valid or binding or had not occurred, like 
the "turning of the screw" that Mr. Chipman referred to on page 14, line # 2, or the " 
crossing that Bridge" referred to by Judge Medley on page 26, line # 23, that were 
referred to needing to happen before a valid or binding order could exist or be signed if 
the stipulations were not complied with. 
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court to separate the parties property from the parties custody issues, and on October 27, 
2003, Judge Medley denied the Appellant of such relief, and furthermore assessed the 
Appellant attorney fees for asking the court to separate the issues. Because of Judge 
Medley's ruling of October 27, 2003, the parties had encountered a different effort, and 
experienced significant expenses because of the court's ruling and refusal to allow the 
property and the custody to be separate issues. In light of the court's prior ruling's, and 
the prior two years of effort or action by the Appellant, there was a strong need to keep 
the stipulated agreement of August 3, 2005 as an "All or None type agreement" 
Therefore, any attempt by the court or the new Guardian ad litem, or the Appellee, to 
separate a valid and binding resolution of custody from a valid and binding resolution of 
the property voids the stipulated agreement of August 3, 2005. 
In August 3, 2005 hearing, Judge Medley breached his own prior ruling and 
justified vacating the court's October 27, 2003 ruling refusing separation of property 
from custody, and the applicable attorney fee assessment against the Appellant, by saying 
on page 26, line # 22 of the transcript, "they seems to make all the sense in the world to 
me that they (property & custody) are separable". 
The Court further abused its discretion on October 6, 2005 by ruling the custody 
was changed and settled without a valid and binding settlement of the property issues, 
thus changing in fact and possibility that the Appellant could obtain custody of the 
children if the Appellant moved away. The District Court error by failing to abide by the 
three previously valid and binding orders that the children were to remain with the 
Appellant. Consequently, and as a result of the court's irreparable harm, the Appellant is 
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now prejudiced by the children having been relocated for so long, and because of the 
error of the court. 
The court erred by not providing the relief it promised, thereby further changing 
the agreement and or allowing the written order of January 9, 2006, to be different than 
the actual stipulation that was agreed to on August 3, 2005. Judge Medley represented to 
the parties that if they could not agree on the agreement to be prepared, that he would 
"sign the transcript from the court proceedings and let the parties take it from there." 
When the parties failed to find agreement in the preparation of the Order, and because the 
court had previously ruled based on the perceived order, Judge Medley refused to abide 
by his order of signing the transcript as noted on page 28, line #1. 
The October 6, 2005 order should be vacated, and the children ordered returned 
immediately to reside with the Appellant until such time as all pending matters can be 
resolved, and the court upon a hearing of the evidence issues a valid and binding order 
otherwise. 
Additionally after the Appellant refused to agree to the stipulations as shown on 
page 26, line # 4, and yet Judge Medley just eight lines later tells the parties he 
'obviously cant' force a stipulation on the parties. It's not something I can do", and again 
on line # 23, he states on the August 3, 2005 hearing transcript, "...I'm not going to cross 
that bridge if I'm required to cross it if, in fact, we have a problem..." 
The district court abused its discretion in failing to resolve all pending issues 
between the parties in that it failed, or to value all assets and liabilities of the parties at 
the date of separation or divorce. As noted in the August 3, 2005 hearing transcript, page 
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28, line # 16, the court recognized the parties were Divorced (referring to the September 
11, 2003 divorce decree issued by Judge Medley). So the date of valuation of the party's 
properties or liabilities should be the value as of the date of separation June 1, 2001, or 
the date of Divorce September 11, 2003. Thus, the court order of January 9, 2006 should 
be vacated and the parties property assets and liabilities should be valued and distributed 
fairly and equally for the appropriate date. Subsequent actions of either party should 
reflect on their individual share or allocation of such assets. Therefore, the Appellee's 
attorney fees would be found to be completely deducted from only her share of the sale 
proceeds if she held any interest in such property at the time this is finally settled. The 
District Court abused it's discretion by allowing a stipulation for attorney fees that could 
be deducted from the property interests of Annabelle Stone, who is not a party to these 
proceedings, and is not bound to pay the Appellee's Attorney fees. At the August 3, 
2005 hearing, the court was well informed as to the fact that the Appellant did not own 
such property as the Appellee may seek to have her attorney fees paid from, thus, neither 
was the Appellant responsible for the payment of the Appellee's attorney fees. After all 
the parties actions are considered, based on their property distribution amount, then the 
Attorney may seek collection from the Appellee alone, for collection of his unpaid 
attorney fees. 
By allowing the agreement to stand, the Appellee's counsel tries to, alter or 
improperly influence the outcome of the other pending court proceedings between 
Annabelle Stone, and Joanne Stone, by directing the court to believe there was an 
agreement between Annabelle Stone and Joanne Stone that the loosing party agrees to the 
71 
payment of the victor's attorney fees. Courts do not award attorney fees in civil cases 
where there is not an agreement between the parties to pay the other parties attorney fees. 
The agreement is an attempt by the Appellee or the District Court to so influence the 
other pending civil litigation between Annabelle Stone and Joanne Stone. Allowing such 
influence is an application of an incorrect standard of justice. Independent cases should 
carry independent rulings and independent judgments against the parties, so as provided 
in Rules of Civil Procedure, "so to not confuse the court if the issues oar confusing", or 
"to expedite justice" the January 9, 2006 Order should be vacated to allow future justice 
to prevail, and correction of court errs. 
POINT 7. 
The trial court erred by failing to allow the two youngest children to 
hire and be represented by an attorney of their choice denying them 
due process and equal application of the law and allowing one of the 
children to sue her father denied him due process of law 
It has been recognized in Utah since 1852, that minors in the Territory and State of 
Utah have not had the legal capacity to sue. See 1876 Compiled Laws of Utah 345; Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-2-1. Today, Rule 17(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes 
the legal incapacity of minors by requiring a minor who is a party to a lawsuit to "appear 
either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by 
the court in which the action is pending." The trial court is specifically authorized by 
UCA 30-3-11.2. to appoint counsel for child "[I]f, in any action . . . involving the custody 
or support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have a separate 
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exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, the court may appoint 
counsel to represent the child throughout the action . . . " Mr#. Stone filed a motion 
of the issues appealed from the prior court proceedings of 2-18-05, was the reinstatement 
of the Appellant's Minor daughter seeking legal action against the Appellant for property 
she was claiming an interest in. Since the issue deals with the jurisdictional issue of the 
minor daughter holding standing to seek legal action against the Appellant, the issue of 
jurisdiction remains with this appeal. Previously, on 1-23-04, the District Court had 
dismissed or stricken the motion for legal action brought by the minor child, and then on 
2-18-05 the District Court considers it again. The ability of a child holding standing to 
seek legal action against their parent in their parent's divorce action is a matter of law and 
appellate review. Thus such jurisdiction of the issue if the District Court had not abused 
its discretion and failed to forward the issue to the Appellate Court, a decision one way or 
another would have been issued, thus the cumulative effect upon the Appellant for not 
allowing proper consideration would not have served to prejudice Mr. Stone. 
The court failed to even respond to counsel's notice of appearance of Frances 
Palacios as representative for the children, Brooklynn and Brylee Stone. However, the 
court had previously set, and accepted the precedence of the other daughter, Brittney, 
having her own counsel assisting her in addition to the Guardian ad Litem, that of C. 
Jeffery Thompsen preparing filings for our other Daughter Brittney Stone. The District 
Court failed to enter into the docket, or otherwise the Notice of Appearance of Counsel 
Frances Palacios to represent our children Brooklynn and Brylee Stone's interests. 
There is not law, or statute, that denies any party to a legal matter or legal 
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proceeding to the benefit of either the counsel of their choice, or to two or more counsels 
representing their interests. There is nothing in state statute that denies a child the 
privilege of having counsel to overlook the Guardian ad litem, if nothing else but to keep 
the Guardian ad litem honest, in the case that often occurs the Guardian ad litem sides 
with one parent over another or is so overworked with that they -earr represent multiple 
parties adequately. 
Even if statute requires the Guardian ad litem to be appointed, constitutional 
protections guarantee proper representation of the parties, and allows them to have the 
counsel representation they desire. The Third District Court accepted without objection 
my Appeal filing thus further supporting that the children were allowed to one or more 
counsel representing their interests. The Third District Court failed respond, and the 
Petitioner failed to object to such as well. 
The actions of failing to deal with the March 2005 Appeal also denied the children 
to their right to non conflicting counsel. Warring parties are entitled to separate counsel, 
and that was not allowed in the actions of the Third District Court. The court records 
show that the Guardian ad litem represented all three children. However, one child was 
warring against the other two children, in that the one child wanted property that the other 
two children did not want to be given to that child. The two children wanted property to 
stay with their Father, so as to enjoy that property while in the company of their Father. 
The Guardian ad Litem violated State Statute that specifically directs the Guardian 
ad Litem to state to the court, their clients interests, even if their clients interests are 
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different than those interests of the Guardian ad Litem. The Guardian ad Litem failed to 
do this in this case. 
POINT 8. 
The award of Attorney fees on April 25, 2006 is not supported by the 
evidence and the court erred in accepting a Fee Affidavit filed under 
incorrect case number. 
The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.'1 Kellev v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, P3(X 9 P.3d 171. 
In order to recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the moving party must set forth 
evidence, 1) demonstrating that the award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial 
need of the requesting party compels the award. The relevant factors for determining the 
reasonableness of the request include, the necessity for the number of hours dedicated, 
the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and the result 
accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for similar services in the community. 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court has "inherent 
power" to award attorney fees to '"compensate for delay, inconvenience and the expense 
resulting from [a party's] behavior."' Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78^14, 985 P.2d 255 
(citation omitted); see also Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) 
(stating trial courts "possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on 
attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases 
through the court.") 
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Mr. Stone sought the court's involvement to correct the errors and deficiencies in 
what the court felt was a final order. Instead of correcting these errors and deficiencies 
the trial court merely assessed attorney fees against Mr. Stone 
The award of fees is fatally flawed from the onset because the fee affidavit was 
filed under the wrong case number. When Mr. Stone received the fee affidavit he did not 
respond because it was filed under case number 17 to this case. Therefore without the 
affidavit being properly filed the award should be vacated and or/ this case should be 
remanded for a proper determination of fees. 
Had the fee affidavit been properly filed the award was unjustified. In order to be 
entitled to attorneys fees moving party must set forth evidence demonstrating that the 
award is reasonable, and establishing the financial need of the requesting party compels 
the award. Mr. Chipman failed to meet both of these requirements. As the affidavit was 
not properly filed there is no evidence in the record to show the fee is or is not proper. 
Mrs. Stones counsel has billed her more than her more than $100,000.00 for 
services rendered in the six plus years this matter has been pending. But because of the 
close personal relationship with her counsel Mrs. Stone has not had to pay the fees billed. 
The Appellant on the other hand has had to pay for his attorney fees all through 
the course of these proceedings. Just because Mr. Stone is currently a pro se litigant, 
does not mean the he did not incur signifigant fees have claims of his own for attorney 
fees that could be awarded against the Appellee, for her egregious and unethical conduct 
that have caused these proceedings to be protracted. Also counsel for Mrs. Stone has 
previously reported he was serving as a favor to his church leaders. Thus, the Appellee 
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has not had to outlay much in the way of her personal finances, and thus had been 
empowered to keep this litigation from being properly when she has essentially had 
access to unlimited legal resources. 
The request for Attorneys fees is ridiculous on its face when the fact that Mrs. 
Stone can incur in excess of $100,000.00 and Mr. Stone must attempt to proceed pro se 
because he cannot afford the cost of representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stone seeks reversal of and remand to the trial court on the issues presented 
above with instructions to the trial court to hear/correct following points... 
Award of Physical custody and the immediate return of the parties' minor children 
to Utah to reside with the Mr. Stone while the matter is hear before the trial court. 
Reversal or Vacating the District Court's orders of October 27, 2003, August 25, 
2004, October 6, 2005, December 12, 2005, January 9, 2006, March 10, 2006, May 15, 
2006 and to correct errors in the District Court rulings. 
Reassignment of the proceedings to a different trial judge because of the animus 
and hostility expressed toward the Appellant, by Judge Medley and the prior relationships 
the District Court held with counsel for Mrs. Stone. Short of such reassignment an 
expressed directive to the trial court to read more than the titles to the pleadings and to 
consider all previously filed letters, papers, submitted by Mr. Stone that were dismissed, 
or rejected or otherwise disallowed or not considered by the District Court, and to allow 
the Appellant to gain access to the court for subsequent issues that remain pending 
between the parties with the District Court. 
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Correction of the past or the ordering of a new Child Custody Evaluation to be 
paid for by Appellee if equal joint custody is contested by the Appellee and 
reimbursement to Appellant for Custody Evaluation amounts paid by the Appellant, since 
actions of the Appellee caused the Custody Evaluation to be invalidated. The services of 
other needed professionals also paid by Appellee. 
Require recording to occur of all meetings of the parties and counsel when issues 
are discussed or mediated or adjudicated until such time as a valid and final order is 
facilitated. 
Ongoing psychiatric family therapy and counseling services to include parents and 
the children on a intermittent or regular basis in a local practice that has not been unduly 
prejudiced or influenced by the Appellee's actions or accusations of the past, and paid 
for equally by the parties involved until such time as the parties are free of opportunity to 
abuse the judicial system for their personal gain, and then until the therapist determines 
such services are no longer needed for the parties. 
Separate counsel for each non-conflicting child, or dismissal in their entirety of the 
Guardian ad litem from serving the children collectively. 
Ruling that the minor children may benefit from the counsel representation or co-
counsel of their choice if such is not an additional cost of service taxed to the courts. 
A non-dischargeable Judgment with interest against the Appellee for all joint or 
Appellant funds taken, or used inappropriately by the Appellee. A non-dischargeable 
Judgment in favor of Appellant for all amounts of Alimony and or child support Appellee 
received as result of the error of the court. 
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Adjustment of marital asset values or child support amounts for adjustment or 
amending Assignment of all Income Tax deductions or advantages to Appellant to 
facilitate equalization of the unjust Income Tax rate and disproportionate tax advantages 
Appellee has received, and or Income Tax that Appellee failed to pay. 
An asset preservation ruling to protect all jointly owned marital property from 
attachment of Attorney liens for any of the parties. 
Judicial transfer of all cemetery property and real estate in question to the 
Appellant because the Appellee's actions either caused foreclosure or excessive expenses 
to be incurred, and a finding of the actions of the Appellant thus preventing foreclosure 
were not suspicious of to be viewed punishable or prejudicially negative by the court. 
A non-dischargeable Judgment against the Appellee for amounts the Appellant 
paid, or caused to be paid that the Appellee should have paid and did not. 
A non-dischargeable Judgment against the Appellee for amounts equal to all harm 
or liability caused by the Appellee instigating and causing the court to participate in 
denial or violation of the Appellant's Constitutional rights or Due Process along with 
punitive and treble damages. 
Immediate reunification of the children with the appellant is the only remedy of 
the error of the court, with counseling or therapy paid for by the Appellee or the court to 
continue for the same amount of time as the Appellant has been denied the children's 
company, association, companionship, and life as they have grown and developed. 
Furthermore, refund of all child support taken from the Appellant for such same 
period of time as was unjustly taken from the Appellant. The subsequent deterioration of 
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the medical condition of the children should not be considered as grounds for retaining 
the error of the court and not returning the children to the custody of the Appellant, 
because Utah is home to one of the nations leading most centers for the treatment of the 
child's ailment. Furthermore, the financial ramifications of the Appellee's relocation 
back to Utah if desired, is also improper to consider as grounds to abstain from correcting 
the error of the court, because the Appellee elected to also separate the custody of the 
children from a valid and binding resolution of the property issues as part of the same 
stipulated agreement of August 3, 2005. A party should not be afforded unjust benefit at 
the expense of the other party or their rights, just because the Appellee elected to act in 
violation the court order or agreement. 
Valuation and distribution of marital assets and debts at the date of divorce, with 
each parties' subsequent actions accountable to themselves with parties being required to 
pay for what interest they want to own, or what benefit they receive, or harm they caused. 
Ruling that any or all equipment needed for the children to enjoy virtual visitation 
or personal visitation with the parent that may elect to move away all is paid for by the 
moving parent. 
Finding of visitation or custodial interference charges against the Appellee, as well 
as order facilitating or directing provisions for compensation to the Appellant for the lost 
visitation time. 
Finding of contempt for the Appellee's actions of violation of prior court orders. 
Reversal of all assessment of attorney fees and costs against the Appellant. 
Such other relief as the Court deems just. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure a separately 
bound addendum accompanies this brief. 
DATED this ^ * day of June, 2007. 
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